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Promoting human rights, peace and democracy in Indonesia 
Suharto dies without being 
brought to justice 
The following statement was issued by TAPOL after the death of Suharto on 27 January 2008: 
It is hard to exaggerate the damage inflicted on 
Indonesia by the form'er dictator Suharto, who died today, 
during the 33 years when he ruled the country with a rod 
of iron until his downfall in May 1998. 
Suharto rose to power on a wave of massacres that 
killed up to one million people, one of the twentieth 
century's worst crimes against humanity for which no one 
has been brought to justice. Tens of thousands more were 
incarcerated and held for more than a decade without 
charge or trial. 13,000 men were banished to the remote 
island of Buru, out of reach of their families and subject to 
a harsh physical environment and unremitting hard 
labour, which caused hundreds of deaths. Hundreds of 
women political prisoners were similarly detained in a 
remote prison camp in Central Java. 
TAPOL founder Carmel Budiardjo, herself a political 
prisoner (tapol) for three years, said : "Millions of 
Indonesians will regret, as I do, the fact that Suharto was 
never called to account for the terrible crimes perpetrated 
during his despotic rule. None of the presidents who have 
held office since 1998 was willing to recognise that the 
rule of law can only have meaning if those who flout it are 
brought to justice. Few present or former heads of state 
the world over have had so much blood on their hands as 
Suharto." 
Following the establishment of Suharto's New Order 
under which the Indonesian military established a system 
of pervasive control over the whole population, the initial 
target of the repression was the Indonesian Communist 
Party, the PKI, and its associated mass organisations. 
These organisations with a combined membership of 
around fifteen million people were banned without any 
means of redress, while their members and families were 
subject to discrimination in every sphere of life. 
Once the PKI had been destroyed and hundreds of 
thousands of its members or sympathisers were either 
dead, behind bars or purged from the state apparatus, 
Suharto turned his attention to the other political parties 
and mass organisations, forcing them to merge and 
swear allegiance to the state ideology, Pancasila. Under 
Suharto's New Order regime, the vibrant political 
traditions that had characterised the country up until the 
imposition of Guided Democracy by his predecessor 
Sukarno in 1959, were destroyed. In furtherance of the 
repressive purposes of the military regime installed under 
Suharto's command, the population was stripped of all its 
political rights, the rule of law ceased to function and 
gross human rights violations occurred without end. 
After Suharto was forced to resign when mass 
demonstrations swept Indonesia in 1998 in response to 
the financial crisis engulfing the country, the political 
constraints on the population were lifted. But the 
damaging impact of military impunity and the lack of 
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respect for the rule of law have continued to prevail, while 
associates of Suharto still exert an influence in many 
parts of the country's body-politic. There has been no 
attempt by post-Suharto governments with the single 
exception of the 20-month presidency of Abdurrahman 
Wahid, to remove many of the influences of the Suharto 
regime. Furthermore, a number of the discriminatory laws 
and regulations are still on the statute book such as 
Decree No 25 adopted by the MPRS, the Supreme 
Legislative Assembly, in 1966, which bans the teaching of 
Marxism-Leninism and which has made it difficult for 
parties suspected of harbouring communist teachings to 
obtain recognition and to operate without being harassed . 
It was under Suharto that Indonesia compelled the 
people of West Papua by force of arms to become a part 
of the Republic of Indonesia, following the fraudulent Act 
of Free Choice in 1969. Since then, the West Papuan 
people have suffered from massive human rights abuses, 
helpless to halt the unbridled plunder of their natural 
resources. While the West Papuan people live in abject 
poverty, the Indonesian state has reaped huge benefits 
from revenues , royalties and taxes from foreign 
enterprises such as Freeport which was granted a 
concession by Suharto to extract copper and gold in 
1967, and it will soon start profiting massively from British 
Petroleum, now renamed Beyond Petroleum, as it starts 
to exploit West Papua's natural gas. 
It was under Suharto that Indonesia launched an act 
of aggression against the people of East Timar (now 
Timor-Leste) in 1975 and occupied the country for over 23 
years. Up to 200,000, a third of the population, died from 
killings or from conflict-related causes . During the 
occupation , the country's administration and economy 
were run by the Indonesian military, 100,000 Timorese 
were displaced from their homes and re-settled in 
'strategic villages' while thousands were incarcerated on 
Atauro island or in prison camps throughout the territory 
It was under Suharto that the province of Aceh was 
also subject to military operations for nearly thirty years 
during which time an estimated 15,000 people lost their 
lives as rampant human rights violations occurred . This 
situation continued until August 2005 when a peace 
agreement was signed between the Indonesian 
government and the resistance movement, GAM. 
Although Suharto was forced to resign in 1998, he 
never faced charges for the many crimes against 
humanity that were perpetrated under his New Order 
regime. The billions of dollars that were plundered by 
Suharto and his family have still not been accounted for 
and returned to the state while the former dictator and his 
offspring continue to control many of the businesses and 
facilities which they acquired by virtue of the privileges 
they enjoyed during the New Order. A few months before 
his death, the World Bank and the UN's Stolen Assets 
Recovery initiative named Suharto as the worst head-of-
state embezzler in the world . 
Now that the man who caused so much suffering, 
bereavement and death in Indonesia and Timor-Leste has 
died, it is beholden upon all of us to keep alive the 
memory of his crimes and to support the efforts of people 
in Indonesia to seek justice and redress for the immense 
damage he inflicted politically and economically on their 
country. 
TAPOL which was set up in 1973 to campaign for the 
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A promise by president Yudhoyono to bring Suharto to 
justice was left unfulfilled (Source: Kompas) 
release of the tens of thousands of political prisoners then 
being held , will to continue to campaign for human rights, 
peace and democracy in Indonesia until the legacy of 
Suharto has been completely erased . 
Komnas HAM to investigate 1965 
killings 
The National Human Rights Commission, Komnas 
HAM, announced in February that it would initiate a 
special investigation into the 1965-1966 killings, to be 
undertaken by an ad hoc team. The team would be 
given three months for the work, with the option to 
extend the period if necessary. The aim would be 
establish whether gross human rights violations 
occurred. Such a finding would mean that formal 
proceedings could take place against those alleged to 
have been responsible. [Kompas, 28 February 2008] 
The current Komnas HAM was set up in 
September last year. This decision was welcomed by 
human rights activists, among others Usman Hamid, 
coordinator of Kontras, the Commission for the 
Disappeared and Victims of Violence. 
The decision to revisit the 1965-66 tragedy is seen 
as a departure from the attitude of previous 
Commissions. It suggests that the new Komnas HAM 
will devote more serious attention to the tragic events 
in the early months of the establishment of Suharto's 
New Order, when an extremely violent crackdown took 
place against the leftwing movement, in particular 
against the Indonesian Communist Party. 
The Commission also announced that it would set 
up another ad hoc team to examine the so-called 
'mysterious killings' of 1983 and 1984 when several 
thousand people were killed in an alleged anti-crime 
campaign. In his autobiography, the former president, 
Suharto publicly acknowledged that he had issued the 
order for these killings. 
These cases will be among the priorities for the 
new Komnas HAM, which also announced that it was 
confronted with a huge backlog of cases, inherited 
from the previous Commission. 
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SUHARTO 
Indonesia's mass murderer 
and kleptocrat 
As Indonesia's former dictator lay dying in January, the country's great-and-good gathered at his 
bedside to pay their respects to a man responsible for deaths and suffering that put him on a par 
with Pol Pot in Cambodia. While President Yudhoyono and former President Abdurrahman Wahid 
paid tribute to a former head of state, many Indonesians regretted that with his passing, ten years 
after his fall from power in May 1998, he would never face justice for the countless crimes against 
humanity perpetrated during his 33-year re'ign of terror in 1lndonesia and the death and destruc-
tion inflicted on East Timor during the 24-year occupation of that country. 
Since being forced to resign by the financial crisis that 
engulfed Indonesia in 1998, Suharto lived as a recluse in 
Cendana, the luxurious family home in the Menteng 
district of Jakarta, basking in the wealth which he, his late 
wife and his offspring plundered during the years when 
the military held a tight grip on the country. He even 
escaped justice for the unparalleled corruption which 
resulted in his being named the worst head-of-state 
embezzler in modern times by the Stolen Assets 
Recovery Initiative, a joint venture of the World Bank and 
the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. 
A life of service to the army 
Born on 8 June 1921 to a family of peasants in the village 
of Kemusu Argamulya in Central Java and having nothing 
more than lower secondary school education, Suharto 
turned at an early age to the military as his vocation. His 
rise in the ranks of the Indonesian Army occurred at a 
time when the country was still under civilian rule, 
following Indonesia's first democratic election held in 
1955. 
Suharto's mil1itary career began during the Japanese 
occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945) when he became a 
battalion commander in PETA, Defenders of the 
Fatherland, a Japanese-trained militia. After the 
Japanese surrender in August 1945, he joined the 
Indonesian army then known as ABRI but now called 
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), on the day it was 
founded on 5 October 1945. In 1957, he became a district 
commander in the Diponegoro Division (Central Java) 
with the rank of colonel. 
In parallel with his military career, he also engaged in 
financial activities to fund his subordinates and provide 
the wherewithal for a system of patronage, which secured 
him loyalty from cronies. In the mid-1950s, he was 
implicated in a sugar-beet smuggling scandal and other 
corrupt practices. This earned him a reprimand and 
removal in disgrace from his Diponegoro post followed by 
a course at the Army Staff and Command School in 
Bandung. But this did not stand in the way of his 
subsequent promotion to brigadier-general in January 
1960. 
After a stint as commander of the unsuccessful 
Operation Mandala in 1960, aimed at driving the Dutch 
from West Papua, he was promoted to major-general and 
appointed commander of the Diponegoro Division. At the 
TAPOL Bulletin 188/189 
March 2008 
height of Indonesia's confrontation with the newly-formed 
state of Malaysia in 1963, Suharto was appointed 
commander of KOSTRAD, the army's elite command. 
This later enabled him to play a strategic role in the 
physical annihilation of the Indonesian Communist Party, 
which by the mid-1960s had become the third largest 
communist party in the world. 
Campaign of terror against the PKI 
The incident on 1 October, 1965 by a group of army 
officers, who kidnapped and murdered six army generals 
and a lower-ranking officer, as part of a conflict within the 
Indonesian army, provided Suharto with the pretext to 
unleash nationwide reprisals against the Indonesian 
Communist Party which he blamed for the incident. As the 
White Terror spread throughout Central and East Java 
and then to other parts of Indonesia, hundreds of 
thousands of communists and alleged communists were 
killed, many together with their families. An estimated 
200,000 people were arrested and held for years without 
charge. By the mid-1970s, some 70,000 were still in 
detention, of whom 13,000 men had been banished to the 
remote island of Buru where they were subject to harsh 
conditions. Hundreds of women prisoners were sent to a 
prison camp in Central Java called Plantungan. The 
remoteness of these camps made family visits and food 
supplies extremely difficult. Hundreds died while in these 
camps as a result of maltreatment and torture; medical 
facilities were virtually non-existent. 
No one has ever been held to account for the killings 
and atrocities that occurred during Suharto's New Order, 
which enabled him to rule 1lndonesia without opposition 
for more than thirty years. It was not until after the 
dictator's downfall that surviving victims were able to 
speak publicly about the ordeals which they and their 
families had suffered. 
As the anti-communist purge got into full swing in late 
1965, Suharto's leading role in the armed forces was 
formalised with h1is appointment by President Sukarno as 
commander of the army on 16 October 1965. Abusing the 
powers given to him by Sukarno, Suharto issued an order 
for all PKI members or suspects to be purged from state 
positions. His grip on the country became further 
entrenched with the special powers granted to him on 11 
March 1966, known as Supersemar. The PKI was banned 
along with associated mass organisations estimated to 
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have a following of some 15 mill ion people. 
The removal of Sukarno 
Suharto acted cautiously in his handling of the popular 
President Sukarno. He showed himself to be the master 
of Javanese-style slow-but-sure tactics, described by 
one biographer as a 'protracted Wayang play'. It was not 
until 12 March 1967 that a heavily purged legislative 
assembly stripped Sukarno of all his powers and 
installed Suharto as acting president. Although he had 
been in control of the country for three years, it was not 
until a year later, on 21 March 1968, that Suharto was 
formally elected to his first five-year term as president by 
a heavi ly purged Consultative Assembly, MPRS. He was 
re-elected unopposed on six subsequent occasions in 
1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993 and 1998. However, it was 
his election in 1998, a time when Indonesia was in deep 
financial crisis, that triggered his downfall as mass 
protests swept the country and demonstrators called for 
his dismissal , making his position untenable. 
Under Suharto's New Order, violence became a 
regular feature, while the fear of being accused as 
communists de-politicised all activists as well as the 
population as a whole, in the interests of security and 
order. Organisations were set up for each section of the 
population , which were obliged to declare their allegiance 
to the government and its Pancasila ideology. There were 
many clampdowns such as the Tanjung Priok affair in 
West Java in September 1984 when dozens of Muslims 
demonstrating outside a mosque were shot dead by the 
security forces and incidents in Lampung, South Sumatra 
in 1987 and later on against plantation workers in North 
Sumatra. 
Brutalities in Timor-Leste, Aceh and Papua 
On the 7th of December 1975, Indonesia invaded East 
Timor (later named Timor-Leste) in the wake of Portugal 's 
withdrawal from the territory. During the 24 years of 
occupation , military operations against a well-organised 
resistance movement resulted in tens of thousand of 
deaths. According to the East Timorese church, an 
estimated 60,000 Timorese died during the first two 
months of the invasion. A special commission set up by 
the UN in 2002, the Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation in East Timor, concluded that 18,600 
Timorese were murdered or disappeared during the 
Indonesian occupation and between 84,000 and 183,000 
more died as a direct result of Indonesia's policies. 
From 1976, the people of Aceh, the western-most 
province of Indonesia, experienced the brutality of 
unrestrained killings when the region was designated a 
'military operations region ' (Daerah Operasi Militer) after 
the establishment of GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in 
1976, which sought to create a separate state. While 
some of the victims were killed during military conflicts, 
the vast majority of those who were struck down were 
unarmed civilians. 
In 1965, after Indonesia had taken control of West 
Papua from the Dutch in 1963, crack troops of the military 
were sent to the region to crush an independence 
movement known as the OPM (Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka, Free Papua Organisation). This resulted in the 
deaths of tens of thousands of people in the following 
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decades, especially after the so-called Act of Free Choice 
in August 1969 when just over one thousand Papuans 
were compelled to take part in the fraudulent Act, sealing 
the territory's fate as a province of Indonesia. Here too, 
the territory was designated a special military area or 
DOM, giving the military free rein to capture, kill or maim 
people deemed to be in favour of independence. 
The 'mysterious' killings 
In 1983, death squads took to the streets in a so-called 
anti-crime operation. For six months, the squads went on 
the rampage, killing alleged criminals or bandits. This 
resulted in the deaths of an estimated three thousand 
people. The killings occurred in a number of cities and 
came to be known as petrus or 'mysterious killings'. The 
precise number of victims was never established 
because the Indonesian media was prohibited from 
reporting the killings. In September 1983, the Far Eastern 
Economic Review reported that the killings were 'set to 
continue until the authorities have reached their 
countrywide target reliably put at 4,000 extra-judicial 
killings '. 
Suharto took personal responsibility for these killings 
in his autobiography, Suharto: Pikiran, Ucapan dan 
Tindakan Saya (Suharto: My Thoughts, Sayings and 
Deeds) in which he wrote: 'The newspapers were full of 
articles about the mysterious deaths of a number of 
people .. .. There was nothing mysterious about it at all. 
Was it right to do nothing? It had to be treated by 
violence. But this did not mean just going out and 
shooting people, bang , bang. No. But those who tried to 
resist, like it or not, had to be shot. Because they resisted, 
they were shot.' 
These killings were a reminder to the population that 
the authorities had the weaponry and determination to 
deal with anyone daring to challenge the government. 
The Family Firm 
During the 33 years of the New Order, the Suharto family 
made good use of the special privileges they enjoyed to 
pursue a wide range of business ventures. First to set the 
pattern was Suharto's wife, Tien (Siti Hartinah) Suharto 
who became known as Madame Ten Percent, thanks to 
her involvement in a wide rang'e of business ventures. 
Together with the tycoon and Suharto crony, Liem Sioe 
Liang, for instance, she took control of PT Bogasari Mills 
which was granted a state monopoly for the import, 
milling and distribution of flour. 
She also became chief patron and beneficiary of 
Taman Mini Indonesia (Indonesia in Miniature) Project, a 
high-profile project covering a large area of land on the 
outskirts of Jakarta, where the traditions and artefacts of 
all the provinces of the country were put on display. Set 
up in 1971 at a cost of $25 million, officials said at the 
time that these funds could have been better used to fund 
52 small businesses or seven large universities. 
As the wife of the president, she chaired Dharma 
Wanita, a compulsory civil servants' wives' association, 
which organised the Family Welfare Movement, a cultural 
movement whose aim was to promote the ideology of 
Suharto's New Order throughout the country, reaching 
down to the villages. Dharma Wanita set the pattern for a 
corporate system under which each section of the 
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community was required to organise themselves in 
organisations owing allegiance to the state. 
Tien Suharto died suddenly on 28 April 1996, 
reportedly from shock, after witnessing a bitter row 
between two of her sons. 
The six children of Suharto and his wife all became 
involved in a wide variety of business ventures, benefiting 
from the many privileges which they enjoyed by virtue of 
being the sons and daughters of the president. According 
to TIME-Asia (24 May 1999), the six Suharto children 
owned between them significant equity in at least 564 
companies, covering a range of commodities and 
businesses from oil and cloves (used in the popular 
kretek cigarettes) to land, toll roads, airlines, hotels, TV 
stations and real estate. Foremost among these offspring 
was Tommy (Hutomo Mandala Putra) Suharto, the 
youngest of the brood and Suharto's favourite son who, 
like his five siblings, benefited from the system of 
patronage set up by Suharto during his 33-year rule. 
Himself a keen sports-car racer, his many companies 
included the Lamborghini sports car company and a 75 
percent stake in an 1 S-hole golf course and 22 luxury 
apartments in Ascot, Britain. 
In 2000, Tommy, became the first (and as yet the only) 
member of the Suharto family to be tried and convicted in 
a court of law. He was given a 15-year sentence for 
ordering the murder of a Supreme Court judge who had 
found him guilty of a land scam and given him an 18-
month jail sentence. But in 2005, in an unprecedented 
decision, he was released from jail after serving only one 
third of his sentence. These days, reports about the far-
flung riches of Tommy Suharto and the cases against him 
pending in courts around the world are hardly ever off the 
front pages of Indonesian newspapers. 
The case against TIME 
In the final years of his life, Suharto was troubled by the 
persistent references to his greed and corruption . 
Perhaps thinking that he could clear his name by taking 
on one of the world's most prestigious news magazines, 
he decided to sue TIME for an article about his 
accumulated wealth . He sued the Asian edition of the 
magazine for defamation for an article it published in May 
1999 titled 'Suharto Inc' which reported that he and his 
family had amassed a fortune of $15 billion. 
After two lower courts rejected the complaint, 
Indonesia's Supreme Court reversed the verdict and 
ordered the magazine, its editor and five staff members to 
pay Suharto the sum of $111 million. The Indonesian 
lawyer who acted for TIME, Todung Mulya Lubis, 
described the verdict as an affront to the principle of press 
freedom. He said: The supporters of Suharto are still 
within the government, within the parliament, within the 
judiciary within the business of society. They may not be 
as strong as in the past but they are still there.' He 
described the judgment of the Supreme Court as 'a blow 
for democracy, for the freedom of the press'. 
While this charade was underway, an agency set up 
by the World Bank and the UN, the StAR (Stolen Assets 
Recovery) initiative, put Suharto at the very top of their list 
of corrupt former heads of state for stealing between $15 
billion and $35 billion during his 33-year rule. The figures 




Suharto from his army days to his deathbed 
(Source: Kompas) 
were based on investigations carried out by 
Transparency International. 
Crimes against 'humanity ignored 
Suharto departed this world on 20 January without facing 
justice for his multiple crimes against humanity or for the 
extremely brutal campaign carried out by his troops in 
their attempt to crush the resistance movement in East 
Tim or. 
Although Suharto was responsible for so many well-
documented crimes of humanity, his crimes never gained 
the world attention accorded to other brutal leaders such 
as Pinochet or Pol Pot. Even when the massacres of 
1965-66 were in full swing, world media coverage was 
meagre. Scanning British media coverage of those 
events, after I returned home to London , I found barely a 
mention of what was going on, and most of the reports 
described the killings as the consequence of a 'civil war'. 
Shortly after returning home in November 1971 
following three years of political imprisonment, I 
happened to be sitting near a group of Amnesty 
International officials who were discussing a report about 
torture. I asked them whether they would include 
Indonesia in their investigations but they appeared to be 
unaware that torture was a problem in Indonesia . 
Comparing the press reports I saw about the massacres 
in Chile when Pinochet took power and reports about the 
1965-66 killings, I was shocked by the lack of coverage 
devoted to Indonesia. 
Suharto could count his blessings that, perhaps apart 
from The Netherlands where Indonesia, a former colony, 
was a familiar topic, he could , and did, get away with blue 
murder without much of the world even noticing . 
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Suharto and the rape of West Papua 
Among the scores of articles that flooded the world's media after Suharto died in January, there 
was hardly a mention of his devastating role in West Papua. Yet, with1in weeks of his assumption 
of power, Indonesia was already negotiating with a US multinational corporation to exploit West 
Papua's most sought after natural resources, providing Indonesia with a major source of revenue 
while depriving the Papuan people of a say in the exploitation of their natural resources. 
In April 1967, two years before the fraudulent Act of 
Free Choice which led to West Papua's formal 
incorporation into the Indonesian Republic, Suharto 
acting then not as president but as General Suharto, a 
member of the cabinet, signed the unique and highly 
favourable First Generation contract of work with the 
New-Orleans based Freeport-McMoran company, the 
text of which was written by the company. This granted 
the company a 30-year concession to mine copper in 
West Papua within a 250,000-acre concession, free from 
land rent or royalties. i President Sukarno who was under 
house arrest before being formally removed from power 
in 1967 had firmly rejected foreign investment and foreign 
aid and a law on foreign investment was still two years 
down the road. 
During the closing decades of the Dutch colonisation 
of West Papua, the territory was used primarily as the 
destination for Indonesians who were banished for taking 
part .in the anti-colonial struggle and there was little 
mention of the natural resources that were to bring such 
huge profits to Indonesia. However, as TAPOL wrote in 
1983ii, important discoveries of oil and copper were made 
by multinational corporations in the 1920s and 1930s, 
and when Allied troops under General McArthur landed in 
West Papua in April 1944, a year ahead of the Allied 
assault that put an end to Japan's three-year occupation 
of Indonesia from 1942 to 1945, they brought with them 
geological teams to evaluate these discoveries and to 
conduct their own explorations. Besides the discovery of 
nickel and cobalt ore in the Cyclops Mountains, they 
confirmed the presence of a deposit of copper along the 
southern reaches of the Cartensz Range, later described 
as the world's largest outcrop of copper with a 
surprisingly high concentration of gold. 
Sukarno forestalls Papuan independence 
When sovereignty was formally transferred from The 
Netherlands to the lndonesiaFl Republic in 1949, West 
Papua, then known as Netherlands New Guinea, was not 
included. This led to years of unsuccessful diplomatic 
lobbying by Indonesia at the United Nations and became 
a cause around which President Sukarno rallied the 
population with a slogan calling for the 'liberat1ion' of West 
Papua and its 'return' to the fold of the Republic. Sukarno 
was in a hurry to assert Indonesia's claim to the territory, 
as a counterblast to Dutch efforts in support of West 
Papua's eventual independence by 1970. In 1961, a New 
Guinea Council had met and adopted a constitution 
consisting of 129 articles for the future state as well as a 
national flag, the Morning Star (Kejora), and a national 
anthem. The flag has since become a powerful symbol for 
the Papuan people of their separate identity and many 
Papuans have faced imprisonment or worse for the act of 
unfurling it. 
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The dispute between Indonesia and The Netherlands 
had raged on for years and came to a head with 
Sukarno's decision to mount an armed attack on the 
territory in 1962, thus placing the military in the forefront 
of the campaign. In early 1962, Suharto, who then held 
the rank of major-general, was given command of the 
Mandala campaign to capture West Papua from the 
Dutch. At the time, he was first deputy to the army chief 
of staff in charge of intelligence and also commander of 
the army's new Strategic Reserve force, which later 
become known as KOSTRAD. Suharto had gathered 
round him a clique of military officers who later became 
his close allies once he had gained power in late 1965. 
Among them was a commando officer, Benny Murdani, 
one of the soldiers parachuted into West Papua. Another 
was Ali Murtopo who was put in charge of testing the 
'combat intelligence' unit attached to the Strategic 
Reserve. Murtopo later took charge of Opsus, the special 
operations unit notorious for political manipulations 
guided by Suharto after 1965. 
During the early stages of the Mandala campaign, 
Indonesian troops carried out a series of small-scale air-
drops from boats based in nearby islands but many 
became ensnared in the thick jungle or landed in 
swamps, unable to cope with the humid tropical 
atmosphere, while much of their equipment was 
damaged or Jost. Although this was proclaimed as an act 
of liberation, the troops were not welcomed by the 
Papuans. Instead they were attacked, many were caught 
and handed over to the Dutch. According to figures 
available at the time, of the 1,419 troops who were 
dropped, 216 were killed or never found and 296 were 
captured. Mandala was a dismal failure both militarily and 
politically. . 
However, regardless of what the Papuans may have 
felt, their future status was to be decided by the 
competing interests of the Dutch, the USA and Indonesia. 
At the heart of the contest was the knowledge, never 
publicly mentioned at the time, of the natural resources 
which existed in such great abundance in West Papua. 
Initially, Washington sided with its Dutch NATO ally, 
but perhaps alarmed by the Dutch plan to grant West 
Papua eventual independence, Washington switched 
sides. Washington was also concerned about Indonesia's 
ties with the Soviet Union with whom it was negotiating an 
arms deal. Under pressure from Washington, the Dutch 
government entered into negotiations with Sukarno 
brokered by the US. This led to the New York Agreement 
between The Netherlands and Indonesia and to the 
Indonesian takeover of West Papua after a six-month 
interregnum under a UN transitional executive authority, 
UNTEA. 
Papuans were not represented in the negotiations 
regarding their future. With the departure of UNTEA in 
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1963, the Indonesian military took control and began a 
crackdown against Papuan resistance that led in 1965 to 
the creation of the OPM, the Free Papua Movement. 
In 1969, the fraudulent Act of Free Choice resulted in 
West Papua's formal incorporation into the Indonesian 
Republic. Although the New York Agreement stated that 
the Act should take place 'in accordance with 
international practice', what happened was that 1,022 
hand-picked Papuans, under intense pressure from the 
Indonesian military, voted unanimously to become part of 
Indonesia. 
Freeport's entry into West Papua 
Within two months of the 1965 coup that brought Suharto 
to power, the geologist Forbes Wilson, who had been 
involved years earlier in the geological investigations in 
West Papua, received a call from Freeport's CEO saying 
he had been privately approached by two oil executives 
and told that negotiations would immediately begin about 
mining Erstperg, the first copper outcrop. The 
Washington government supported Freeport's 
association with the new regime by guaranteeing a $60 
million loan to the company that enabled it to proceed 
with the extreme!.;' expensive initial stages of the project. 
The Ertsberg mine was officially opened by Suharto in 
March 1973, on which occasion he announced that the 
territory would be called lrian Jaya. (Many years later, 
President Abdurrahman Wahid reversed this decision and 
named it Papua.) 
Freeport needed to build the infrastructure for the 
copper and gold mine in Tembagapura at an elevation of 
4,500 metres through what the company called 
'inhospitable country', 68 miles from the coast. This 
meant installing a pipeline to carry the copper slurry down 
to the coast. Construction took five years to complete 
before production could begin and was described at the 
time as a 'stupendous engineering' feat. For Papuans 
living in the vicinity, the project violated and destroyed 
their mountain, which they regarded as their 'spiritual 
mother'. Their ancestral ties with the land were simply 
ignored and they were evicted from their homes, to be re-
settled in coastal hamlets, without a thought about the 
impact of the new environment, away from the cool, clear 
air around their mountain homes to the hot, malaria-
infested coastal plain. 
The leading Indonesian week'ly Tempo wrote: It is 
logical for these mountain perople not to feel at home. 
Besides the climate, the houses built for them by the local 
government are quite unsuitable. They are very basic, 
just bare huts with a roof and an earthen floor. In their 
native villages, these people had houses with wooden 
floors. 'We feel ill. We can't sleep,' said one woman living 
in one of these huts, pointing to the earthen floors on 
which they have to sleep.iii 
A Jayapura-based newspaper reported that an 
epidemic swept through their kampungs, killing 216 
children, more than 20 percent of the infant population. A 
doctor complained of the lack of funds for medicines to 
fight the epidemic, only a stone's throw from Freeport 
which was by then already worth $150 million a year.iv 
During its twenty-year life-span, Erstberg produced 
thirty-two million tonnes of copper, silver and gold and 
generated an annual income for the company of around 




Grasberg, a bottomless pit 
But the Erstberg find was overshadowed by the discovery 
of Grasberg. This resulted in Freeport signing two new 
Contracts of Work with Jakarta in 1991 and 1994, gaining 
exploration rights to approximately nine million acres and 
the right to mine further discoveries in the area for 
another fifty years. By the end of the decade, Grasberg 
was annually producing more than double the ore 
recovered from Erstberg during its life. Grasberg is famed 
for having the world's largest deposit of gold, far in excess 
of the output of South Africa's 1largest mine. It holds the 
world's third largest open-pit copper reserves and at 
extraction rates of 10 cents per pound is the lowest-cost 
copper producer in the world. According to Denise Leith, 
'Estimates of Grasberg's worth continue to increase so 
that despite all predictions the final worth of the mine is 
impossible to predict; it is classified as 'open at depth', 
which is a euphemism for a bottomless pit. •v 
Further exploration of more than six thousand sites 
had by 2001 identiified about seventy potential mining 
sites with ·drilling commencing on about ten of these. 
Freeport's owner, Jim-Bob Moffett, a loud-mouthed 
tycoon from New Orleans, believes that the region will 
eventually produce other Grasbergs, eclipsing the riches 
of Pangguna, Ok Tedi, Lihir and Porgera in Papua New 
Guinea.Vi 
In May 1995, the British mining giant, Rio Tinto, 
became involved in Grasberg at a time when Freeport, 
with expenditures mounting, was forced to look for an 
experienced and well-capitalised partner. The contract 
with Rio Tinto gave it an interest of about 14 percent for 
an initial payment of $1.7 billion. About half of this amount 
was in the form of a loan to be spent on future exploration 
and development in Freeport regarding contracts of work 
in West Papua. Under the deal, Rio Tinto's interest was 
limited to the Grasberg operation, entitling it to 40 percent 
of discoveries and expansions proven after December 
1994 together with any output at Grasberg above 118,000 
tonnes per day. 
In 2004, Rio Tinto sold its shares in Grasberg for $883 
million while retaining its 40 percent joint venture interest 
in reserves as a consequence of expansions and 
developments at the Grasberg mine since 1998. 
The Suharto-Moffett duo 
Moffett's ties with Suharto and his inner circle are known 
to have been very close. Between 1991 and 1997, the 
company made at least $673 million of loan guarantees 
to three Indonesians closely tied to Suharto. Suharto 
allies, including at least one cabinet minister, bought 
assets from the company such as housing and a hotel 
near the mine. Freeport not only helped to finance the 
deals but also guaranteed the buyers sizable annual 
profits. The company also agreed to subsidise interest 
payments for a Suharto family business partner, enabling 
him to purchase 4.7% of Freeport's Indonesian unit. 
According to the New York Times, 'For years, to 
secure Freeport's domain, James R Moffett... the 
company's chairman, assiduously courted Indonesia's 
long-term dictator, President Suharto, and his cronies, 
having Freeport pay for their vacations and some of their 
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children's college education, and cutting them in on deals 
that made them rich, current and former employees 
said .'vi i 
In 1997, when Freeport wanted to more than double 
its Grasberg output, Moffett took the case directly to 
Suharto who scrawled his approval of the controversial 
expansion in the margins of Moffett's personal letter to 
him. But this was just one year before Suharto's fall from 
power. In an article published by the Wall Street Journal 
four months after the dictator's downfall , it was stated that 
in the mid-1990s, Moffett, through building a personal 
relation with one of Suharto's closest confidants , Bob 
Hassan, began spending time with the first family. He 
golfed with the president and became close friends with 
his second daughter, Siti Hedianti. 
Shares in Freeport that were in the hands of the 
Bakrie family, not a close ally of the President, were 
liquidated on the orders of Suharto and were bought by 
PT Nusamba Mineral lndustri, the parent company of 
which, Nusamba, was widely known to be controlled by 
the Suharto family. According to Bob Hasan, Nusamba 
was 80% owned by three Suharto-chaired foundations, 
10% owned by his eldest son and 10% owned by Bob 
Hasan. (Suharto had set up a number of foundations or 
yayasan during his New Order, ostensibly for charitable 
purposes but which became the means by which he and 
his family gained control of a large number of 
businesses.)viii One Freeport official described Bob 
Hasan as being 'part and parcel of the Suharto family' . 
Resistance to Freeport 
In 1977, attention was drawn to grave human rights 
problems around the Freeport mine when Amnesty 
International reported that the military who were guarding 
the project were using steel containers obtained from the 
Freeport mine as cells to incarcerate Papuans for long 
periods. These arrests followed in the wake of tension 
that erupted when local people cut the pipeline. The 
incident was documented by a church publication, Berita 
Oeikumene in April 1980. 
' .. the background to the conflict around Tembagapura 
.. . is that the local inhabitants felt disadvantage by the 
presence of a foreign mining company whilst their 
complaints do not receive proper response, either from 
the company or from the government. .. The underground 
movement against the American company burst open at 
6am on 18 June 1977 ... by attacking a police post. .. then 
blocking the llaga airstrip near Tembagapura with tree 
stakes. When the army launched a counter attack, they 
withdrew to the forest. ... A pipe transporting copper slurry 
mixed with gold from the mine - at a height of 11.5 
thousand feet down to the Timika harbour on the Arafura 
Sea was blown up by guerrilla forces. A bridge was also 
blown up and some Freeport oil storage tanks were 
destroyed by fire. Over a period of several months, 
Freeport was sustaining losses of several million dollars 
a day.' 
However, the Amungme people were to suffer 
greatly ... 'At the end of August, two OV-10 Bronco 
bombers rained the region of Akimuga with bullets. Those 
who survived fled to the forests.... These counter-
guerrilla attacks were not confined to air attacks; ground 
attacks went on for several months as well as arrests and 
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detentions.' 
According to an Australian journalist, Denis 
Reinhardt,ix Three lrianese villages associated with the 
mine, the shanty town at Tembagapura, and 
encampments at Waa, five kilometres from 
Tembagapura, and at Timika are reported to hav~ been 
levelled by Indonesian troops in the days following the 
sabotage. One European who recently returned fror:n the 
area alleges that Indonesian troops mortared Waa village 
for two days before moving in and burning the remnants.'x 
Another wave of protest against Freeport erupted in 
February 2006 when about four hundred local miners 
barricaded the road to the mine, protesting against their 
forced removal from the area because they had been 
sifting through the waste pumped from the Grasberg 
mine. Two days earlier, police and company security 
guards had approached a group of gold panners and told 
them to leave the area. One newspaper wrote: 'Many 
locals earn their living through retrieving and selling tiny 
amounts of copper and gold from tailings, or waste rock, 
dumped by the mine. The Freeport mine .. . has long had 
an uneasy relationship with locals, many of whom are 
poor.' 
These activities led to the closure of the mine for two 
days. Meanwhile, reports which referred to the local 
miners as 'illegal' were angrily refuted . 
The incidents in the vicinity of the mine led to a series 
of demonstrations in Jakarta in front of the head office of 
Freeport. The protesters said that the mining operations 
had not brought any benefits to local residents d!-Jring its 
40 years of operations. One of the protesters said: 
'Freeport has to be closed because the environment has 
been damaged and many locals were massacred just 
because of its presence in Papua.'xi This allegation goes 
back to the findings of two researchers. An Australian 
anthropologist, Chris Ballard who worked for Freeport, 
and Abigail Abrash, an American human rights 
campaigner, estimated that 160 people had been killed by 
the military between 1975 and 1997 in the mine area and 
its surroundings.xii 
Damning evidence about human rights abuses 
committed in the vicinity of Freeport was made public by 
Bishop Munninghoff in Jayapura in a 28-page report in 
August 1995. One of the many shocking incidents was an 
attack by Indonesian troops who opened fire on a group 
of villagers gathered together for an act of worship. 
Eleven people were shot dead, including four children. 
The villagers had spent several months in the forest, 
seeking refuge from the fighting between local guerrillas 
and the Indonesian army. As they gathered in Hoea, 
trying to decide whether to remain in the forest or return 
to their village, they were discovered by a unit of soldiers 
on a mission to hunt down members of the OPM. The 
troops opened fire without warning and with horrifying 
consequences. xiii 
No action against environmental damage 
It was not until 2000 that anyone in government in Jakarta 
criticised Freeport for the tremendous environmental 
damage it caused. The Environment Minister in the 
government of Abdurrahman Wahid, Sonny Keraf 
announced that the government was planning to revoke a 
permit allowing the company to dump tailings into rivers 
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near the mine. He accused the company of causing far 
too much pollution , 'which in turn had made life difficult for 
natives living nearby the mining areas'. A press report 
pointed out that the company processes 200,000 tonnes 
of ore every day, of which only about 3.5% yields copper 
and gold The remaining crushed waste ore known as 
tailings form grey muck which is discarded in the 
Aghawagon-Otomona-Ajkya river system. More than 
210,000 tons of tailings are deposited downstream as fine 
sand every day. 'Tailings have inflicted massive damage 
to forests located south of the mine, with some literally 
buried under the crushed waste ore.'xiv 
Environmentalists were not convinced that the 
minister's get-tough message would have any impact and 
they were right. The same press report said: 'Due to 
pressure on the government, no serious action was taken 
against Freeport, not even when it was revealed that 
13,300 hectares of forest-land had been laid waste by the 
tailings.' 
In 2006,WALHI, Indonesia's leading environmental 
watchdog, issued a report about Freeport which said that 
the company, along with its joint venture partner, Rio 
Tinto, had failed to comply with government orders to 
amend its dangerous waste management practices 
despite years of official findings that it was in breach of 
environmental regulations. The organisation said : 'The 
law is not enforced by the Ministry of Environment due to 
the joint venture's pervasive financial and political 
influence, to the degree that a Freeport-Rio Tinto 
proposal for circumventing water quality standards 
seems to be under consideration.' WALHI said the 
company had been polluting the river system and the 
estuarine environment in breach of regulatory water 
quality standards and that it was discharging acid rock 
drainage without a hazardous waste licence at levels 
breaching industrial effluent standards and has failed to 
establish mandatory monitoring points.xv 
Wealth and poverty, cheek by jowl 
For nearly forty years, the operations of Freeport have 
provided the Indonesian state with substantial earnings in 
the form of royalties, dividends and taxes, becoming by 
far the country's largest taxpayer. 
According to a statement by the company earlier this 
year, Freeport paid a total of $1.8 billion (Rp 17 trillion) to 
the Indonesian government in 2007, including corporate 
income tax, employee income tax, regional tax and other 
taxes totalling $1.4 billion, royalties of $164 million and 
dividends worth $216 million. This was higher than in 
2006 when the figure was $1.6 billion. These figures 
show a hefty increase from its payments to Jakarta in the 
previous five years when the total was $6.9 billion.xvi 
Freeport chairman, Jim-Bob Moffett and the 
company's chief executive officer, Richard Adkherson, 
have pocketed huge earnings. According to a federal 
regulatory filing in June last year, Moffett's earnings 
totalled $32.8 million in 2006, including $2.6 million in 
salary, and $27,400,000 in cash incentive payments. He 
also received $234,864 in above-market or preferential 
earnings on deferred compensation and $2,331,292 in 
perquisites and other compensation, including 
contributions to his retirement plans, $278,644 in 
personal use of company aircraft, and $92,532 in 




The chief executive had to make do with a bit less, 
earning a salary of $1 .25 million, $3,532,000 in cash 
incentives and stock awards with an estimated value of 
$18,048,000, plus more than $2 million in deferred 
compensation and contributions to his retirement plans. 
As for Papuans whose resources these men have 
plundered for so many years, the vast majority are poor 
by any standards and still worse, they are becoming 
marginalized in their homeland with the arrival of 
hundreds of thousands of migrants from other parts of 
Indonesia. Poverty is the fate even of Papuans living in 
the vicinity of Freeport. According to the Mimika Statistics 
Agency, more than half the population in the regency, 
which is where Freeport is located, live below the poverty 
line. As many as 28,000 of the 45,000 families are poor 
and lack access to health care. Many of the houses in 
Timika as well as in Kwamki Lama villages, Karaka Island 
and Asmat village in East Mimika district are unsuitable 
for habitation. 'Mimika is one of the biggest mining areas 
in the world but its people are still categorised as poor. ' 
According to research carried out in 2002, health 
service care in Papua 'is below acceptable standards' . 
The investigation concluded that 36.1 % of Papuans had 
no access to health facilities while 61.6% had no access 
to clean water. The percentage of undernourished 
children under five was 28.3%.xvii 
Following the political demise of Suharto, there were 
calls for the contract with Freeport to be renegotiated but 
these have led nowhere. One government minister said 
that pressure on Freeport might damage Indonesia's 
reputation in the eyes of other potential foreign investors. 
Suharto's generous giveaway to a far-away US mining 
company was nothing less than the rape of Papua, assets 
stolen from the people of Papua that left them destitute 
and deprived them of the right to determine how, by 
whom or indeed whether their natural resources should 
be exploited . 
i Denise Leith, The Politics of Power: Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia, 
2003, p 60 
ii West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, 1983. 
iii Tempo, 13 September, 1980. 
iv Tifa lrian, June 1980. 
v Op.cit., note 1, p 63 
vi Op.cit, note1 , page 69. 
vii New York Times, 'Below a Mountain of Wealth, A River of Waste', 
29 December, 2005 
viii Wall Street Journal, 29 September 1998. 
ix Nation Review, 15-21September1977. 
x Op. cit. note 2. 
xi Jakarta Post, 23 February and 1 March 2006 
xii New York Times, 27 December 2005. 
xiii Quoted in TAPOL Bulletin No 131, October 1995. 
xiv Indonesian Observer, 'Environmental minister blasts Freeport', 17 
June 2000. 
xv WALHI Report on Freeport-Rio Tinto, May 2006. 
xvi Antara News Agency, 6 February 2008 
xvii Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in West-Papua, published by 
The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland, 2005. 
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'A climate of fear' 
'A climate of fear undeniably prevails in West Papua ... ' says the Special Representative of UN 
Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders, Hina Jilani, in her report to the UN Human Rights 
Council, published in January. The situation of human rights defenders has not eased despite the 
adoption of the Special Autonomy Law in 2001, she concludes. As if to underUne the gravity of 
the situation, a number of human rights defenders whom she met were specifically targeted dur-
ing and after the end of her June 2007 mission. 
The Special Representative's concerns were 
previously highlighted in a statement issued following her 
visit. i The full report provides further details of the 
disturbing situation she encountered. 
Incidents involving arbitrary detent1ion, torture, and 
harassment through surveillance were reported . She 
expresses particular concern about allegations that when 
defenders expose abuse of authority or other forms of 
human rights violations committed by the security 
apparatus, they are labeled as separatists in order to 
undermine their credibility. This places them at greater 
risk and must be discouraged by the authorities, says the 
Special Representative. 
Defenders 'working for the preservation of the 
environment and the right over land and natural 
resources (deforestation and illegal logging) frequently 
receive threats from private actors with powerful 
economic interests but are granted no protection by the 
police'. The Special Representative reminds the 
Government that it has a responsibility to protect its 
citizens against the harmful activities of non-State actors. 
This climate of fear has reportedly worsened since the 
Abepura incident in March 2006, when five members of 
the security forces were killed after clashes with 
protesters demanding the closure of the Freeport mine, 
she says. Lawyers and human rights defenders involved 
with the trial received death threats. The harassment of 
these lawyers and defenders around the trial was 
interpreted as a warning to the community of human 
rights defenders, who have decreased their activities out 
of fear of harsh treatment. 
Tight restrictions on freedom to monitor and 
investigate violations 
Interference with freedom of movement and with 
defenders' efforts to monitor and investigate human rights 
violations was also reported. The Special Representative 
says that she was perturbed to hear the National 
Commission on Human Rights, Komnas HAM, is 
prevented by law enforcement authorities from carrying 
out its official duties. She was particularly disconcerted by 
reports that Albert Rumbekwan, Director of Komnas HAM 
in West Papua, was intimidated and threatened on 
several occasions by the police and unidentified persons 
in the course of his fact-finding activities. At one point his 
team were warned that if they continued with an 
investigation they would be killed. 
The Special Representative was 'disturbed by reports 
that international human rights monitors and journalists 
entering West Papua are subject to tight restrictions and 
only a few are permitted to operate, resulting in a scarcity 
of information on the human rights situation in West 
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Papua, mostly with regard to allegations of human rights 
abuses occurring in remote areas. Despite guarantees 
given by Jakarta to allow visits to West Papua, local 
authorities often deny access.' 
Defenders threatened and intimidated 
The Special Representative draws attention to several 
cases of human rights defenders being threatened and 
intimidated during and after her visit. They included 
Federika Korain, Rev Perinus Koyoga, and Barthol 
Yomen of the Justice and Peace Commission of the 
Catholic Diocese of Jayapura (SKP Jayapura) whose 
vehicle was hit by a car driven by intelligence officers, 
Yan Christian Warinussy, Director of the Manokwari-
based NGO, LP3BH, who the day after meeting the· 
Special Representative and subsequently was subjected 
to surveillance from a vehicle used by intelligence agents 
and received threatening text messages linking his 
human rights work to the separatist movement, and Albert 
Rumbekwan, who received death threats on his mobile 
phone.ii 
The case of Albert Rumbekwan was the most 
worrying, says the Special Representative. He was told: 
'You who are reporting about the human rights situation in 
Papua are trying to destroy the people. You want 
evidence of people being killed, I will kill your tribe, your 
family and your children will become only bones to show 
that there is only a zone of peace in Papua'. 
Despite Government assurances that Mr Rumbekwan 
was given police protection, the Special Representative 
Continued on page 12 
Special Representative of UN Secretary General on 
Human Rights Defenders Hina Jilani 
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WEST PAPUA 
Congressman's visit highlights 
problems of access 
A visit to West Papua in late November by US Congressman, Eni Faleomavaega, ended in a deba-
cle when his time for meetings was reduced from five days to two hours and he was prevented 
from visiting the capital of Papua province, Jayapura. The curtailment of the visit and the restric-
tions on Faleomavaega's movements were imposed by the Indonesian military, TNI, citing securi-
ty concerns and disregarding commitments made by the Indonesian Government. The events 
provide a stark reminder of the TN l's oppressive presence in West Papua and its ability to control 
access to, and movement within, the territory. 
Eni Faleomavaega is the Representative to the US 
Congress of the Pacific-Island territory of American 
Samoa. He is a member of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and a prominent supporter of self-
determination for West Papua. 
His visit was timed-10 coincide with the UN Climate 
Change Conference in Bali in December and followed the 
Government's refusal to allow a visit in July 2007 [see 
TAPOL Bulletin , No. 187, p. 8] . It was the Congressman 's 
understanding that he would visit the towns of Biak and 
Manokwari and, most importantly, Jayapura. 
In a letter to President Yudhoyono dated 13 
December, he said: 
'I was deeply disappointed that upon my arrival I was 
again denied entry into Jayapura and that my time was 
reduced from 5 days to only two hours of actual meetings 
with the leaders and people of Biak and Manokwari due to 
supposedly security concerns. ' 
'Such a decision ... begs the question if all is well 
throughout the provinces of Papua and West Papua, why 
is security a problem at all?' 
Overpowering military presence 
He described how, during a meeting in Biak, the highly 
respected tribal chief, Tom Beanal , was detained by the 
military. Papuans who had gathered in the streets in Biak 
'were denied the opportunity to meet with us, and US 
Ambassador Cameron Hume and I had to force our way 
through a military barricade just to meet with the Papuan 
people who had to walk several miles from the airport and 
wait in the hot sun because Indonesian military forces 
(TNI) barred them from meeting with Ambassador Hume 
and me.' 
'I was deeply disturbed by the overpowering military 
presence, which I felt was completely unnecessary,' 
Faleomavaega said. 
It was even worse in Manokwari, he recalled. He was 
told that he would meet the Governor of West Papua 
province only to learn on his arrival that the Governor was 
in China. 
'Nonetheless, Ambassador Hume and I were put in a 
car, without any escort and with only a single traffic police 
unit in front. While we do not require special privileges, we 
were very aware that our delegation was not given the 
necessary escort because the TNI was intent on 
deceiving the Papuans who had gathered on the streets 
waiting for us.' 
'Arriving at the office of the Governor who was in 
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China, and after meeting for less than 10 minutes with the 
Vice Governor, I was told that due to weather and security 
concerns, 1. would need to depart immediately. In no 
uncertain terms, I was told by the TNI military :leaders that 
Ambassador Hume and I were not welcome in 
Manokwari.' 
Faleomavaega and Ambassador Hume were driven 
back to the airport without official escort or 
accompaniment, meaning they were placed in 
unfavourable circumstances. 
'While I felt no danger whatsoever from the Papuans 
who were unarmed and only wanted to meet with us, I 
was very uncomfortable that the TNI military was so bent 
on not a'llowing even a conversation to take place.' 
'It was my hope and understanding that I would be 
able to meet with the people and leaders of both 
provinces but, when I saw how heavily armed that the TNI 
military was, I knew that the military had no intention of 
honoring the commitment that President SBY and I had 
made in Jakarta in July of this year.' 
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Papuans intimidated, harassed and abused 
Referring to his promise to support President Yudhoyono 
in his efforts to implement special autonomy, 
Faleomavaega said: 
' .. . as long as the TNI military forces of Indonesia 
continue to deny Members of Congress real access to the 
provinces of Papua and West Papua, especially 
Jayapura, it will be difficult for me to support the goals of 
Special Autonomy when clearly the Papuans in these two 
provinces are still being intimidated, harassed and 
abused by the TNI. ' 
'Likewise, I do not consider two hours in Biak and 1 O 
minutes in Manokwari as access. Until I am allowed to 
visit Jayapura, as I have been promised, and until I am 
allowed to meet with the people of Papua, as President 
SBY and I agreed, I cannot in good conscience inform my 
colleagues in Congress that progress is being made to 
implement the Special Autonomy Law which has mostly 
remained dormant since 2001 and, since for the past 60 
years, until President SBY's leadership, the government 
of Indonesia has done absolutely nothing to help the 
Papuan people who only want to be treated humanely. ' 
' ... whether or not we move forward is entirely up to 
President SBY and those who control the activities of 
Indonesia's TNI military forces.' 
Letter to UN Secretary-General 
In a letter to UN Secretary-General , Ban Ki-Moon, dated 
14 February 2008, Faleomavaega and fellow 
Congressman, Donald Payne, expressed their growing 
Continued from page 1 O 
says she 'remains concerned at reports that threats 
against Mr. Rumbekwan and his family persist, indicating 
that the measures taken by the police are ineffective and 
should be reinforced '. 
Father John Jonga 
A case not referred to by the Special Representative is 
that of Catholic priest, John Jonga, who has been living in 
the sub-district of Waris, district of Arso, on the border 
with PNG, for seven years. The Jakarta daily, Suara 
Pembaruan, reported on 20 September 2007 that he 
made a formal complaint to the MRP, the Papuan 
People's Assembly, that he had been subjected to threats 
and intimidation since August 2006. 
'I described what happened to me and to the people 
of Waris.' He said he had sought protection from the local 
police because of the threats and intimidation he has 
experienced from the military. The threats began 'when I 
described the security situation in Waris where there is an 
army post located in every kampung ' He had submitted 
a report (on the situation) to the Indonesian government 
in 2004 but there was no response. 
During the seven years he has been in Waris, he has 
had many very bad experiences, he said, but following 
the arrival of Kopassus (the army's special forces 
command) the situation got even worse. 'They frequently 
ask very intimidating questions such as 'who is hiding 
guns?' or 'who is a member of the OPM?' or 'do you 
possess a Morning Star flag?' 
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concern about human rights violations and 'the tight 
restrictions placed upon journalists, human rights activists 
and diplomats trying to obtain access to West Papua'. 
'As you know, nongovernmental organizations, the 
media and foreign officials can act as witnesses to and 
bulwarks against human rights abuses as well as agents 
of change. So, the failure of these individuals to gain 
unobstructed access to the country hinders Papuans' 
stories of human rights abuse, quashing of civil liberties 
and inability to express their right to self-determination 
from coming to the fore,' they said. 
The two Congressmen called upon the UN Security 
Council to 'address the security concerns posed by 
human rights abuse in West Papua' and to appoint a 
senior official to pursue senior-level dialogue between the 
Indonesian Government and Papuan leaders to be 
mediated by a Security Council representative. 
The concerns about unreasonable restrictions on 
international access were repeated by the two 
Congressmen in a letter to President Yudhoyono dated 10 
March 2008. The .letter also drew attention to the failure 
of special autonomy and the misuse of force by the 
military epitomised by Faleomavaega's experiences 
during his visit. 
The chief of police of the district admitted that the 
number of complaints had increased following the Special 
Representative's visit. He told Pastor Jonga there was 
little that the police could do and advised him to convey 
his concerns to the military commander of West Papua. 
On 24 September, Amnesty International expressed 
fears for Father Jonga's safety, and said that 'he had 
been advised not to return to Waris for the time being'. 
The Kopassus commander had allegedly threatened to 
kill the priest and bury him in a 700-metre deep gorge. 
They accused him of spreading false allegations about 
conditions in Waris to local and international NGOs and of 
being a provocateur and betraying the Indonesian state. 
Adverse political conditions to blame 
In her conclusions, the Special Representative says she 
remains concerned about the situation of human rights 
defenders in West Papua and 'believes that their ability to 
defend human rights is adversely affected by the political 
conditions generated by the increased military presence 
in the province. The non-implementation of the Special 
Autonomy Law has heightened tensions that result in 
protest against repressive policies and targeting of 
human rights defenders who raise such issues.' 
i See TAPOL Bulletin No 187, p. 12. 
ii See TAPOL Bulletin, No 187, p. 13. 
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Papuans protest flag-flying ban 
There have been a number of serious incidents in West Papua in the past few months. A ban on 
flying the Morning Star flag was reinforced by a presidential decree late last year as 1 December, 
the day regarded by Papuans as their national day, approached. More than a dozen Papuans were 
arrested in March this year following demonstrations in Manokwari. A Papua-based lawyer was 
arrested and is now on trial for forwarding an SMS message about possible dangers confronting 
Papuans. 
The 1st of December is celebrated every year by 
Papuans at home and abroad. It marks the day in 1961 
when Papuan representatives agreed a Constitution for a 
future independent state and adopted a national flag, the 
Morning Star flag, Kejora, and a national anthem for the 
first time. Their homeland was still a Dutch colony at the 
time and the Dutch authorities had indicated their support 
for Papua to become an independent state. Celebrations 
of the historic day always consist of unfurling the Kejora, 
as well as holding communal prayers and rallies in favour 
of peace and dialogue. 
Raising the Papuan flag was a serious offence under 
Suharto. Of the four succeeding presidents, it was only 
Abdurrahman Wahid who adopted a more conciliatory 
approach and announced that the flag could be flown on 
condition that the Indonesian national flag was alongside. 
However, his successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri reversed 
this decision, declaring that flying the flag was illegal. This 
policy has continued to the present day. 
On 1 December 2004, two Papuans defied the ban 
and have paid for their defiance with very heavy 
sentences. Filep Karma and Yusak Pakage were tried for 
the action five months later. Yusak Pakage was 
sentenced to ten years while Filep Karma was sentenced 
to fifteen years. Both men are still serving their sentences. 
[See TAPOL Bulletin, No 179, July 2005] 
While these two men are serving heavy sentences for 
engaging in a peaceful action, security force officers 
continue to enjoy impunity for a host of crimes perpetrated 
over the years in West Papua. 
More acts of defiance in 2007 
Last year, the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
reiterated the ban on flying the flag. The promulgation of 
Presidential Decree 77/2007 banning the use of unofficial 
local symbols has sparked a series of protest 
demonstrations and demands for a referendum on the 
territory's future. 
A report from Front Pepera, the United Front of 
Struggle of the People of West Papua, announced on 1 
December last year that the Morning Star flag was held 
aloft in Timika for two hours in the morning until a unit of 
Brimob police turned up and pulled it down. Fifteen 
people involved in the ceremony were arrested. The flag 
was raised in other places too. In Mimika a large crowd of 
people hoisted the flag at dawn on 1 December but within 
minutes, the police arrived and pulled the flag down; six 
people were arrested. 
It remains to be seen whether those who were 
arrested on these occasions will go on tria'I and, if so, 
whether they too will be given harsh sentences. 
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Focus now on protesting against PP 77/2007 
In a departure from normal practice, the latest 
demonstrations have been devoted to protesting against 
the presidential decree. Those participating have been 
enjoined not to fly the flag. 
Two demonstrations were held in Manokwari in March 
this year for the specific purpose of protesting against 
presidential decree 77/2007. Taking the lead was an 
organisation called the West Papua National Assembly. 
Although some of those at the demonstration raised the 
flag, the organisers made a point of stressing that it 
should not have been unfurled. They stressed moreover 
that the demonstrations had been held with police 
permission. 
Two Papuans who have taken responsibility for the 
protest demonstrations are now in police custody. One is 
Frans Kareth, an economist, arrested following a 
demonstration on 3 March and immediately subjected to 
police interrogation. He was informed that he was likely to 
be charged under several articles of the Criminal Code, 
including Articles 106, 107 and 110 which criminalise acts 
of separatism and subversion. The maximum penalty 
under Article 106 is life while the maximum penalty for 
subversion is fifteen years. 
Protestors raise the Morning Star outside the 
Indonesian Embassy in Canberra 
The other person arrested and now likely to face 
serious charges is Jack Wanggai. His arrest occurred 
following the second demonstration on 13 March. One of 
the organisers of this demonstration, Daviid Rumbiak of 
the Manokwari Law School, said that introducing PP77 
would not help solve the problems in West Papua. 
Several leaders of the student council of the Law School 
involved in organising the demonstration said that it had 
not been held to unfurl the Kejora flag and they regretted 
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Sabar lwanggin, on trial for sending a text message 
that some of those present had done so. Nevertheless, 
they said that they would take responsibility for what had 
happened. All those demonstrators who had raised flag 
were immediately arrested, including a youngster aged 15 
years. 
One of the demands made during this second 
demonstration was for the Papuan People's Assembly, 
the MRP, to be disbanded, on the grounds that it had 
proven ineffective. The demonstrators also complained 
bitterly about the government's failure to implement Law 
No 21, 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua. In both 
demonstrations, there were calls for a referendum . 
When Jack Wanggai turned up at the second 
demonstration, he said he had already received two 
summonses from the police. He delivered a speech and 
then handed himself over to the police. His lawyer, Yan 
Christian Warinussy, said the police should be aware that 
the international community is watching what is 
happening in West Papua. 
Lawyer on trial for sending SMS 
A human rights lawyer based in Papua is now on trial for 
sending an SMS message to several friends and his 
brother. lwanggin Sabar Olif, 43 years old, a volunteer 
lawyer with the human rights NGO, ELSHAM in 
Jayapura, was arrested on 18 October last year by troops 
of DENSUS 88, the Special Anti-Terror Detachment, and 
the Indonesian police. His arrest provoked many 
complaints from human rights groups. 
The message he sent was as follows: 'The latest news 
is to beware (of the fact) that SBY (a term widely used for 
the Indonesian President) has issued an instruction to 
annihilate the Papuan people and to take control of their 
natural resources. The annihilation will happen by 
poisoning food, hiring doctors, taking over food stalls, 
hiring ojek (a means of transportation), using chauffeurs 
and ABRI. Circulate this before it's too late. Maya IPDN 
BNDUNG.' 
The human rights organisation, ELSHAM said on 24 
October that the lawyer had received the message from 
someone by the name of Marta Yowey and had forwarded 
it to five colleagues and his brother to urge them to take 
care and protect their families because the issue of 
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poisoning was becoming more widespread in Papua. (For 
several weeks late last year, there were alarming reports 
of Papuans falling ill and vomiting , and even dying from 
drinking an allegedly toxic alcoholic beverage.) 
ELSHAM , acting on behalf of lwanggin 's legal 
counsel, questioned the involvement of DENSUS 88 in 
his arrest, which imp.lied that he was involved a terrorist 
crime . When he was taken to Jakarta for further 
interrogation, fears for his safety intensified. ELSHAM 
also said he had been arrested without an arrest warrant 
as requi red by law. 
DENSUS or to give it its full name, Detachment 88, is 
a 400-strong anti-terrorist police force that was set up to 
combat terrorism after the 2002 Bali bombings, which 
killed more than 200 people. It was originally formed from 
members of the notoriously brutal special police unit, 
Brimob. 
Human rights activists were also concerned that the 
police were intercepting mobile phone messages and 
believe that recording devices have been set up in 
several parts of West Papua. 
On trial for incitement 
After spending several weeks with DENSUS 88 then in 
police custody in Jakarta, lwanggin was taken to 
Jayapura and is now on trial facing the charge of 
incitement under Article 160 of the Criminal Code for 
which the maximum penalty is five years imprisonment. 
The charge sheet also alleges that his circulation of the 
SMS had incited the general public and caused 
widespread panic among people who believed the 
contents of the message must be true. Human rights 
activists say that similarly-worded SMS messages have 
been circulating in Papua for months. 
After the prosecutor presented the charges, counsel 
for lwanggin submitted a demurrer objecting to the way he 
was arrested for an apparently special crime whereas he 
was now facing normal criminal charges. They also took 
exception to the fact that during the interrogation which 
took place in Jakarta even though the alleged crime took 
place in Jayapura, he was accused of defaming the good 
name of the President. They urged the panel of judges to 
dismiss the case and release the defendant. However, the 
judges rejected the complaints and decided to continue 
with the trial. 
At the time of writing, testimony from two witnesses, a 
husband and wife, has been heard; they were questioned 
about whether they had received or heard of the SMS 
sent by the accused. The husband said he had received 
the message and they had decided to send it on to the 
President's wife for her comment but she had only 
expressed her thanks for the message. 
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Police abuse widespread: UN 
torture expert 
The problem of police abuse of detainees is sufficiently widespread as to warrant immediate 
attention by the Government according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak. 
The lack of legal and institutional safeguards and structural impunity render persons deprived of 
their liberty extremely vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment, the Special Rapporteur said in a 
statement following his visit to Indonesia in November 2007. 
Abuses include 'beatings by fists, rattan or wooden 
sticks, cable, iron bars and hammers'. In some cases, 
'police officers had shot detainees in their legs from close 
range, or electrocuted them'. Some detainees alleged 'to 
have had heavy implf:!ments (chairs, desks, and car jacks) 
placed on their feet'. 
In most instances, it appears that the purpose of this 
violence was to extract confessions, the Special 
Rapporteur concluded. 
In his opinion, detainees are more vulnerable to abuse 
while in police custody than in prison. In several 
instances he arrived at police stations as beatings were 
taking place. 
His findings confirm a worrying trend towards 
increasing abuses by the police. This was also 
highlighted in a Human Rights Watch report on violations 
in West Papua's central highlands pub'lished last July.i 
The Government's decision to invite the Special 
Rapporteur was in itself an encouraging sign that 
Indonesia intends to improve its co-operation with UN 
human rights mechanisms. Previous administrations had 
refused requests for a visit dating back to 1993. However, 
its response to the Special Rapporteur's report will be the 
real test of its commitment to upholding human rights. 
The fulil report will be submitted to the UN Human 
Rights Council at its 7th session in March 2008. 
Problem must be confronted head on 
Acknowledging Indonesia's progress in overcoming the 
legacy of the Suharto era and noting that no country in the 
world is immune to the crimes of torture and ill-treatment, 
the Special Rapporteur said that 'the key element in 
effectively combating this problem is for each and every 
State to recognize this reality and confront the problem 
head on'. 
The Special Rapporteur expressed regret that the 
crime of torture has not yet been included in Indonesia's 
Penal Code despite many recommendations by national 
and international observers urging such a move. 
He further regretted that Government officials could 
not cite one instance in which a public official was 
sentenced by a criminal court for committing torture or ill-
treatment, observing that bringing perpetrators to justice 
is the strongest signal that torture and ill-treatment is 
absolutely unacceptable. 
Legal safeguards for detainees, in particular at the 
pre-trial stage, are vi ~rtually non-existent, in violation of 
applicable international norms and standards to which 
Indonesia has subscribed. Of particular concern is the 
prolonged period of police custody allowed under the law, 
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at times up to several months. During this time many 
detainees have no or very restricted access to courts. 
Furthermore, corruption in the criminal justice system 
is reported as widespread and only very few detainees 
appear to have access to a defense lawyer. There are 
apparently no effective mechanisms by which the legality 
of detention can be reviewed by an impartial body or by 
which a detainee might file a complaint about ill-treatment 
or torture. 
In this context, the application of the death penalty 
continued to be inappropriate said the Special 
Rapporteur. 
Conditions ,of detention 
The Special Rapporteur found that many of the prisons he 
visited were spacious, clean, well-maintained, and 
relatively open to visits by relatives and friends. However, 
some prisons, such as Pondok Bambu and Cipinang in 
Jakarta were seriously overcrowded. This has 
repercussions in terms of hygiene and security. There 
were numerous complaints about the lack of food and in 
Cipinang corruption 'appears so endemic that money 
must be handed over for virtually every basic amenity'. 
Serious medical conditions can be left untreated if the 
detainee cannot afford to pay for treatment 
Detention facilities and prisons also have 'orientation 
programmes' that are incompatible with international 
standards. Newly arrived inmates are placed in 
conditions of 'quarantine' - often several days in small, 
dark and dirty cells as observed in Wamena prison in 
West Papua. 
Conditions are generally worse in police custody 
facilities where there is often limited ventilation, no natural 
daylight and no possibility to exercise. The fact that many 
detainees are held there for up to several months 
exacerbates the situation. 
Women and children 
The Special Rapporteur said he was extremely 
concerned that criminal responsibility starts at the age of 
eight and that therefore small children are put in detention 
facilities and prisons, very often mixed with much older 
children and adults. Children are at greater risk of 
corporal punishment and ill-treatment in detention. 
The Special Rapporteur welcomed the adoption of a 
2004 law banning violence in the household and 
establishing complaints channels. However, he was 
informed that many obstacles still hamper the 
implementation of this law, such as the lack of awareness 
Continued on page 19 
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Human Rights Council to 
rev1iew Indonesia 
A new mechanism has been established by the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council to review 
member states' fulfilment of their human rights obligations and commitments. Indonesia will be 
considered as part of the first review session in April 2008. The process allows for the active 
engagement of NGOs. The following submission was made by TAPOL to the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in November 2007. 
1. This submission is made to the OHCHR by TAPOL, 
a UK-based NGO, formed in 1973, which promotes 
human rights , peace and democracy in Indonesia. 
TAPOL is a relevant stakeholder under Human Rights 
Council Resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007. 
Priority issue: Impunity 
2. The submission highlights the issue of impunity and 
recommends that the Human Rights Council (HRC) 
addresses four particular concerns in its review of 
Indonesia: 
a) the normative and institutional problems associated 
with the investigation, prosecution, and delivery of justice 
in relation to cases of past violations of human rights; 
b) the need for dissemination and implementation in 
Indonesia of the report of Timor-Leste's Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). 
c) the inadequacies of the Indonesia/Timar-Leste 
Commission of Truth and Friendship; and 
d) the need for national and regional truth and 
reconciliation mechanisms to be established. 
Recommendations to the OHCHR/HRC 
3. General 
The Indonesian government should be encouraged to: 
implement in full the International Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and all other human rights treaties it has ratified ; 
fulfill the commitment it has made to sign and ratify the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance; and 
improve its co-operation with the UN special 
procedure mechanisms and treaty monitoring bodies and 
its record of implementing their recommendations. 
4. Accountability for past violations 
The HRC should explore with the Indonesian 
government ways in which problems relating to the 
involvement of the President and Parliament in 
proceedings under Law 26/2000 on Human Rights 
Courts, and the failure of the Attorney General to pursue 
cases vigorously, can be addressed, possibly by 
enhancing the involvement of the National Commission 
on Human Rights, Komnas HAM. 
The HRC should encourage Indonesia to review Law 
26/2000 and related legislation to ensure that the human 
rights courts have comprehensive jurisdiction over 
serious human rights crimes that do not amount to crimes 
against humanity or genocide. 
The HRC should consider ways of enhancing 
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technical co-operation for the training of judges and other 
judicial personnel involved in human rights cases. 
5. CAVR report 
The HRC should propose that the Indonesian 
government and parliament formally consider the CAVR 
report and act on its recommendations without further 
delay; 
The HRC should consider how it can support 
Indonesian civil society efforts to disseminate the report 
and raise awareness about its findings. 
6. Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) 
The HRC should make eilear its disapproval of 
outcomes of the CTF process that contravene 
international standards concerning the denial of impunity 
for serious crimes. It should urge Indonesia to co-operate 
with Timorese and international efforts to secure 
accountability for serious crimes committed in Timor-
Leste. In particular, given Indonesia's failure to deliver 
credible justice, the HRC should consider lending its 
support to recommendations by the UN Commission of 
Experts and CAVR concerning the creation of an 
international criminal tribunal for Timor Leste. 
7. Truth and Reconciliation mechanisms 
The HRC should consider providing technical and 
other support to the Indonesian government and civil 
society groups for their efforts to establish national and 
regional TRC mechanisms based on public consultation 
and international standards. 
Background: International· human rights 
commitments and compliance 
8. Indonesia has made significant progress in its 
transition to democracy since the downfall of the 
authoritarian Suharto regime in May 1998, notably with 
the holding of multi-party elections in 2004 and the 
achievement of peace in Aceh. However, much more 
remains to be achieved. In particular, the country's record 
on human rights, the rule of law and impunity falls short of 
the standards e~pected of a fully-functioning democracy. 
Little progress has been made in investigating and 
~rosecuting those responsible for Suharto-era and 
subsequent atrocities - most notably the slaughter of 
hundreds of thousands of left-wing suspects fol.lowing the 
rise to power of Suharto in 1965, the widespread killings 
in Timor-Leste, Aceh and West Papua, and the murder of 
the leading human rights defender and critic of impunity, 
Munir, in 2004. One means of addressing past abuses, 
Indonesia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has 
been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
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Court. 
9. The government has demonstrated an intention to 
uphold international human rights norms by its ratification 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in May 2006. It should be pressed by 
the HRC and the treaty monitoring bodies to 
implement in full these and other treaties it has 
ratified. On 12 March 2007, Indonesia's Minister of Law 
and Human Rights, Hamid Awaluddin , made a 
commitment to the HRC to sign and ratify the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance. The government should be 
encouraged to fulfil that commitment as soon as 
possible. 
10. The government has improved its outward co-
operation with the UN special procedure mechanisms. 
The Special Rapporteur on Torture is visiting in November 
2007 following requests dating back to 1993. The Special 
'Representative of the Secretary-General on Human 
Rights Defenders visited in June 2007 and the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants visited in 
December 2006. However, the government has failed to 
respond to requests to visit by the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion, and the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions and its record of 
acting on the recommendations and communications of 
the special mechanisms and treaty monitoring bodies is 
unsatisfactory. The situation of human rights defenders in 
West Papua, for example, has deteriorated significantly 
since the visit of the Secretary-General's special 
representative. The Government should be pressed to 
improve its substantive co-operation with the UN 
special procedure mechanisms and treaty monitoring 
bodies and its record of implementing the 
recommendations of those bodies. 
11 . The Special Representative on Human Rights 
Defenders noted several positive steps that had been 
taken to strengthen the legal and institutional framework 
for the promotion of human rights. She referred in 
particular to the establishment of the Ad hoc Human 
Rights Courts, the National Human Rights Commission 
(Komnas HAM), the National Commission on Violence 
Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) and the adoption 
of the National Plan of Action. However, she also 
observed 'serious constraints on the functioning of many 
of these organizations [sic.] and their ability to fulfil their 
mandates effectively'. She concluded that 'there is a 
resistance to changing attitudes and institutional culture 
which has made it difficult for these institutions to make a 
full commitment to eliminate impunity for human rights 
violations' and 'even less commitment to removing 
impunity for past abuses' 
Accountability for past violations 
12. TAPOL wishes to provide further information about 
some of the systemic problems that have precluded the 
successful resolution of past cases of abuse and 
consequently prevented the ending of impunity. The 
practice of impunity has serious implications for 
Indonesia's transition to democracy. It encourages the 
expectation that human rights violations will go 
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unpunished and creates the risk that patterns of abuse 
will be repeated, especially in conflict areas such as West 
Papua where alleged perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations in Timor-Leste have emerged in key positions of 
responsibility (see for example the case of Col. 
Burhanuddin Siagian indicted on crimes against humanity 
charges in Timor-Leste, TAPOL press release, 28 June 
2007, at http://tapol.gn.apc.org/press/files/pr070628.htm). 
13. The information in this submission is prefaced by 
the observation that at the heart of the problem of 
impunity lies a lack of political will to ensure accountability 
and address adequately some of the root causes, such as 
judicial corruption and the need for effective military 
reform. The lack of political will is related to the ongoing 
political influence of the Indonesian military and its ability 
to ensure that military personnel are effectively beyond 
the law. Cases of gross violations of human rights are 
often politically sensitive, but that cannot be used as a 
reason to avoid the fair and effective prosecution of 
alleged perpetrators. The government, with the 
assistance of the UN human rights mechanisms, must 
find ways of neutralising the political dimension of such 
cases so that justice and the rule of law can prevail. 
14. A number of substantive and procedural problems 
have arisen from the implementation of a key piece of 
legislation, Law 26/2000 on Human Rights Courts, many 
of which were identified at the drafting stage. The law was 
passed in 2000 in response to international pressure for 
accountability for serious crimes committed in Timor-
Leste. It establishes ad hoc and permanent human rights 
courts with jurisdiction over gross violations of human 
rights amounting to genocide or crimes against humanity. 
It provides that initial inquiries (penyelidikan) into cases of 
gross violations should be conducted by Komnas HAM. If 
there is sufficient preliminary evidence of a gross 
violation, the case is referred to the Attorney General, 
whose office is required to conduct an investigation 
(penyidikan). Violations occurring after the law came into 
force are then heard by a permanent human rights court. 
Violations occurring before the law are heard by an ad 
hoc human rights court. An ad hoc court can be set up 
only by a President1ial decree following a recommendation 
by parliament (this is supposed to address concerns that 
the prosecution of crimes that pre-date the law may 
offend the principle against retroactivity). 
15. A number of cases have been dealt with under 
Law 26/2000. Some have resulted in unsuccessful 
prosecutions (notably those relating to the Timor-Leste, 
Tanjung Priok and Abepura 2000 cases), partly because 
the indictments and prosecutions did not make use of the 
findings of the associated Komnas HAM inquiry; others 
have not proceeded beyond the inquiry or investigation 
phase (including the Trisakti and Semangg1i I and IU 
shooting of students in 1998 and 1999; the May 1998 riots 
that accompanied Suharto's fall from power; the forced 
disappearance of 13 pro-democracy activists prior to 
Suharto's downfall, which all pre-dated the law; and the 
Wasior (2001) and Wamena (2003) killings in West 
Papua, which took place after the law was passed). There 
is concern that certain cases have been halted or become 
dormant since being passed to the Attorney-General's 
office. Victims' groups and Komnas HAM have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the handling of the cases. Although 
the main fault does not lie with Komnas HAM itself, its 
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new chairman lfdhal Kasim, appointed in September 
2007, has acknowledged decreasing trust in Komnas 
HAM's ability to perform because of its failure to meet 
public expectations concerning the delivery of justice (see 
'Komnas HAM must be realistic in setting targets : 
Chairman ', The Jakarta Post, 12 November 2007) . 
16. The proceedings of the ad hoc human rights court 
for Timor-Leste have been examined at length by 
numerous observers and experts and widely regarded by 
them as a failure. In particular, a UN Commission of 
Experts concluded in May 2005 that the prosecutions 
were 'manifestly inadequate' and showed 'scant respect 
for relevant international standards' . They were 
'undertaken at a time when there was an evident lack of 
political will to prosecute'. The prosecuting authorities 
were described as lacking commitment, expertise, 
experience and training and were accused of conducting 
'deficient investigations' and of 'inadequate presentation 
of inculpatory material at trial' . 
17. More generally, there is uncertainty about the 
parliamentary mechanism for addressing ad hoc cases 
(the practice has developed whereby cases are 
considered initially by a parliamentary commission, but 
some commission recommendations have been rejected 
by the full house) and the stage at which parliament 
should become involved. According to Law 26/2000 (Art 
43), parliament's only role is to provide a recommendation 
that an ad hoc human rights court be established. This 
suggests that Parliament should not intervene until the 
Attorney General's office has completed its investigation 
and decided there is sufficient evidence to prosecute. 
However, in some cases, the Attorney General's office 
appears reluctant even to start an investigation without 
Parliament's approval. The Attorney General has also 
resorted to seeking parliamentary approval for the 
prosecution of violations that occurred after the law came 
into force in 2000 (e.g the Wasior and Wamena cases in 
West Papua), which is not a legal requirement. 
18. The involvement of Parliament and the President 
at any stage is controversial since it allows for political 
interference in a judicial process. The fact that the 
Attorney General is deferring to Parliament at an earlier 
stage than necessary and in cases in which Parliament is 
not a legitimate interlocutor heightens concern about the 
politicisation of such cases. The HRC is encouraged to 
explore with the Indonesian government ways in 
which this problem can be addressed. There may, for 
example, be scope for greater involvement of Komnas 
HAM as a non-political body. It may be appropriate to 
consider allowing Komnas HAM to undertake 
prosecutions in the same was as Indonesia's Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) . Certainly, Komnas 
HAM's ability to conduct inquiries could be strengthened 
by enabling it to subpoena witnesses without court 
approval. 
19. The limited substantive jurisdiction of Law 26/2000 
is also problematic in that it extends only to gross 
violations amounting to genocide and crimes against 
humanity. 'Lesser' human rights crimes are not included. 
The current right of military and police personnel to be 
tried before a military tribunal for 'lesser' crimes even if 
they are of a non-military nature is a further source of 
impunity. The limitations of Law 26/2000 may have 
contributed to the prosecution 's failure to secure a 
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conviction in the Abepura 2000 case. This concerned the 
killing of three students and the torture of dozens more in 
Abepura, West Papua in December 2000. Two senior 
officers were indicted under the crimes against humanity 
provisions of Law 26/2000. They were charged with 
command responsibility for abuses committed by their 
subordinates. The court found that there was evidence of 
abuse and torture, but that it was not systematic and 
could not support a conviction under Law 26/2000. The 
court pointed out that the abuse should have given rise to 
charges under Indonesia's ordinary criminal law. 
20. This outcome was predicted by the then head of 
Komnas HAM, Abdul Hakim Nusantara, who said many 
serious crimes would go unpunished because of the need 
to prove they were part of a 'systematic and widespread' 
attack on the civilian population, a key element of crimes 
against humanity: 'I think such an extraordinary standard 
should be reviewed as it is too demanding a requirement 
to meet,' he said. 'Torture and rape and extrajudicial 
killings are serious offences and should be heard in a 
human rights court even though they may not be 
systematic and widespread.' ['General to Face 
Indonesia's Rights Court', Sydney Morning Herald, 8 May 
2004.) The HRC should encourage Indonesia to 
review law 26/2000 and related legislation to ensure 
that the human rights courts have comprehensive 
jurisdiction over ser,ious human rights crimes that do 
not amount to crimes against humanity or genocide. 
The court's jurisdiction should in particular include the 
crime of torture, which is not currently an offence in 
Indonesia despite a recommendation in November 2001 
by the Committee against Torture that it should be 
prohibited under criminal law. 
21 . The understandable lack of expertise of judges, 
prosecutors and investigators in such cases is also an 
obstacle to the delivery of fair and credible justice. 
Judges, for example, who have been brought up in a 
corrupt system with little or no training in international 
human rights law are expected to suddenly handle 
complicated crimes against humanity cases which are 
beyond their competence. The HRC and OHCHR 
should consider ways of enhancing technical co-
operation for the training of judges and other judicial 
personnel. 
CAVR report 
22. The report of Timor-Leste's UN-established 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR), completed in October 2005, provides the most 
detailed and comprehensive documentation of the human 
rights abuses committed by the Indonesian military and 
police and their militia proxies in Timor-Leste. The 
Commission recommended that the Indonesian 
government tables the report in the Indonesian 
Parliament, contributes to a reparations fund for the 
victims, and takes a number of other steps to foster 
reconciliation between the two countries. To date, the 
government has publicly ignored the report and President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has dismissed it as a 
domestic matter for Timor-Leste. The HRC should 
propose that the Indonesian government and 
Parliament formally consider the CAVR report and act 
on its recommendations without further delay. 
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23. Part of the process of addressing impunity is 
educating the Indonesian public about the truth of 
Indonesia's record of abuse in Timor-Leste. Indonesian 
civil society groups have taken steps to disseminate the 
report and raise awareness about its findings, but more 
needs to be done. The HRC should consider how it 
can support their efforts in this regard . 
Commission of Truth and Friendship 
24. The CTF, set up by the governments of Indonesia 
and Timor-Leste in March 2005 (without the involvement 
of either parliament), is widely perceived as a mechanism 
established to avoid international justice for those 
accused of serious crimes in Timor-Leste. The UN 
Commission of Experts expressed concern that its does 
not enjoy public support in Timor-Leste and that its terms 
of reference include provisions that contradict 
international standards on the denial of impunity for 
serious crimes. The CTF cannot recommend prosecution 
or other judicial measures and amnesty provisions allow 
alleged perpetrators to avoid accountability. The CTF 
hearings have been used by the perpetrators to wrongly 
blame the UN and other actors for the violence in Timor-
Leste. 
25. The CTF is supposed to operate under the 
principles of Indonesia's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) and doubt has been cast on its legal 
basis by a decision of Indonesia's Constitutional Court to 
declare the TRC unconstitutional because of its amnesty 
provisions (see below). However, the CTF appears to be 
proceeding to a conclusion. Its final report may be 
available to the HRC at the time of its 1st session review. 
The HRC should make clear its disapproval of 
outcomes of the CTF process that contravene 
international standards concerning the. denial of 
impunity for serious crimes. It should urge Indonesia 
Continued from page 15 
about the need to address domestic violence and the 
insufficient number of appropriate police units to deal with 
such complaints. 
Recommendations 
The Special Rapporteur recommended that the 
Government take a number of measures to comply with 
its obligations under both· the Indonesian Constitution and 
international law. They included criminalising torture in 
accordance with the Convention against Torture; 
introducing complaints mechanisms within places of 
detention; reducing the time limits for police custody; 
supporting the National Commission on Human Rights, 
Komnas HAM, in 'becoming an effective player in the fight 
against torture, in terms of their monitoring role as well as 
addressing impunity'; and acceding to the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention against Torture, which 
provides for unannounced visits to places of detention. 
Committee against Torture 
Many of these issues will be addressed also by the 
Committee against Torture (CAT) at its fortieth session in 
May 2008. The CAT is a separate body of experts, based 
at the UN in Geneva, that monitors States' compliance 
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to co-operate with Timorese and international efforts 
to secure accountability for serious crimes 
committed in Timor-Leste. In particular, given 
Indonesia's failure to deliver credible justice, it 
should consider lending its support to 
recommendations by the UN Commission of Experts 
and CAVR concerning the creation of an international 
criminal tribunal for Timor Leste. 
Truth and Reconciliation mechanisms 
26. In December 2006, Indonesia's Constitutional Court 
ruled that a 2004 law establishing the Indonesian TRC 
was unconstitutional because it empowered the 
President to grant amnesties to perpetrators of gross 
human rights violations and made compensation and 
rehabilitation for victims dependent on the granting of 
amnesties. The TRC now has no legal basis and cannot 
be set up until new legislation is passed. The Court's 
decision to annul the law in its entirety, rather than just 
the offending amnesty provisions, has left the victims 
without an important means of restitution and redress. 
The ruling has implications for truth and reconciliation in 
Aceh since Article 229 of Law 11/2006 on the 
Governance of Aceh provides for an Aceh TRC to be 
established as part of the national TRC. There are also 
provisions in Law 21/2001 on special autonomy for West 
Papua for the establishment of a West Papuan TRC. 
27. Civil society groups in Aceh are drafting a model 
for an Aceh TRC and new enabling legislation since this 
process is seen as integral to the sustainability of peace 
in Aceh. The HRC should consider providing 
technical and other support to the Indonesian 
government and civil society groups for their efforts 
to establish national and regional TRC mechanisms 
based on public consultation and international 
standards. 
with the Convention against Torture. 
Responding to Indonesia's second periodic report 
dated September 2005 (State parties to the Convention 
are obliged to report to CAT every four years), the 
Committee has published a list of issues it will consider 
including: the incorporation of the Convention into 
Indonesian domestic law; the implementation of basic 
safeguards for detained persons; the jurisdiction of the 
morality or religious police; the incidence of alleged cases 
of torture being prosecuted as disciplinary or ordinary 
criminal cases; and P[Oblems relating to trafficking, 
sexual violence in conflict areas, Indonesian migrant 
workers, human rights defenders and religious 
minorities.ii 
Indonesia's initial report to CAT was considered in 
2001 and CAT's Conclusions and Recommendations 
published on 22 November 2001. 
i SeeTAPOLBulletin, No. 187, p11 . 




Munir: Unravelling the role of BIN 
After more than a year of stagnation, investigations into the murd~~ of hu~an ~ights activist Munir 
gathered momentum when the Attorney-General filed for a Judrcral Rev,rew m ~uly_ las_t year to 
challenge the Supreme Court's decision to acquit Garuda pilot Pollycarpus Prrh~rr Pnyanto ~f 
murder. Then, the former president-director of Garuda was indicted on charges of involvement m 
the murder. As the facts begin to unravel, the role of the intelligence agency, BIN, may soon be 
within reach. 
Munir Said Thalib was widely acknowledged to be 
Indonesia's leading human rights activist. He was 
murdered while on a flight from Jakarta to Amsterdam on 
7 September, 2004. He collapsed in agony during the 
flight and was pronounced dead by a doctor on board, 
several hours before the plane landed at Schiphol airport. 
Forensic evidence later established that he had ingested 
a lethal dose of arsenic during the flight. 
Munir, 39, devoted most of his professional life to 
exposing injustices in Indonesia and East Timer that 
occurred during the Suharto era and following the 
dictator's downfall in May 1998. He played a key role in 
investigating atrocities in occupied East Timer and in 
West Papua and Aceh, and his fear.less pursuit of crimes 
against humanity made him many enemies among the 
military. 
In late 1997, he co-founded Kontras, the Commission 
for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence and later set 
up lmparsial, the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor. He 
was named Man of the Year by an Indonesian Muslim 
journal, UMMAT, as well as being named a Young Leader 
of the Millennium by Asiaweek in 2000. That same year, 
he was the recipient in Sweden of the Right Livelihood 
Award, which is regarded as the alternative Nobel Peace 
Prize, 'for his courage and dedication in fighting for 
human rights and the civilian control of the military in 
Indonesia'. 
In the months before his death, Munir received many 
threats warning him of dire consequences if he continued 
with his activities. Friends urged him to stop using his 
motorbike in Jakarta, as he could more easily be targeted 
by those wanting to get rid of him. 
National and international outrage at his death forced 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to agree to a 
thorough investigation . An independent Fact-Finding 
Team established by presidential decision reached the 
conclusion that Munir died at the hands of a conspiracy 
involving high-ranking state officials. However, the Team's 
report has never been published . 
Two UN human rights rapporteurs who have visited 
Indonesia in the past year urged the Indonesian 
government not to allow the Munir case to slide. The UN 
Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions, Philip 
Alston, also drew attention to the murder at the 4th 
Human Rights Council meeting last year. Members of the 
US Congress wrote to President Yudhoyono calling for 
the murder to be solved and there has been unrelenting 
pressure from Suciwati, Munir's widow, and her lawyer, 
Usman Hamid, in many countries not to let the matter rest 
until justice is done. 
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Judicial Review reverses Pollycarpus 
acquittal 
The case gathered momentum when the Attorney-
General's office announced in July last year that it would 
be filing for a Judicial Review. Attorney-General 
Hendarman Supandji explained that new evidence had 
made it possible to take the unprecedented step of re-
opening the case which had been foreclosed by the 
Supreme Court in 2006. The aim of the Judicial Review 
was to reverse the Supreme Court's ruling acquitting the 
off-duty Garuda pilot Pollycarpus of murder. 
Police investigations in 2004 had led to Polycarpus's 
conviction for murder. He was travelling on the Garuda 
flight ailong with Munir and gave up his business class 
seat to Munir. But he was later acquitted of the murder in 
a highly contentious Supreme Court decision, and left 
with a two-year sentence for using a false document 
assigning him to travel on Garuda Flight 97 4. The 
question of why he was using a false document which 
allowed him to travel on the Garuda flight together with 
Munir was left unanswered despite the obvious 
connection between the false document and the murder. 
However, two months after the Supreme Court had 
completed its Judicial Review hearings, it was announced 
that the Supreme Court had reversed its verdict on 
Pollycarpus with a decision to sentence him to twenty 
years for his part in the murder. 
In a statement following the announcement of the 
decision, Kontras expressed its appreciation of the 
Supreme Court's efforts to address the involvement of 
Pollycarpus. 'We hope (this) will be followed by additional 
steps to find the masterminds behind Munir's murder. 
Pollycarpus was merely the weapon used by others to kill 
Munir,' it said. 
A key factor in the Judicial Review related to the 
nature and provenance of the fake document used by the 
Garuda pilot to travel on Garuda Flight 974. According to 
Usman Hamid, the lawyer acting for Munir's widow, 
Suciwati, who was given access to the dossier drawn up 
in preparation for the Judicial Review, the prosecutors 
wanted to know why the Supreme Court which ruled that 
Pollycarpus was guilty of using a fake document did not 
insist on finding out why he needed the document, why he 
swapped his business seat with Munir who was travelling 
economy class, and why he had called Munir a number of 
times by phone prior to the flight, even though the two 
men were not acquainted. 
One witness, a well-known Indonesian musician 
Raymond Latuimahalo was also a passenger on the flight. 
He initially testified that he saw Pollycarpus give Munir a 
drink at the Coffee Bean Cafe during a stopover at 
Singapore's Changi Airport but later withdrew the 
statement, saying he had made it under duress. However, 
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another passenger on the flight, a young Indonesian 
student, testified that she saw Pollycarpus giving Munir a 
drink at the Coffee Bean Cafe and several other 
witnesses also testified to the same effect. 
Evidence produced during the Judicial Review 
indicated that the poison ingested by Munir was contained 
in a drink he was given during the stopover in Changi 
Airport and not on board the flight, as was previously 
thought. 
Ex-Garuda chief sentenced 
In April 2007, Garuda's former president-director, Indra 
Setiawan and another senior airline official, Rohaini Aini , 
the chief secretary of the Garuda pilots, were arrested in 
connection with the letter instructing Pollycarpus to fly on 
Garuda Flight 97 4 'for reasons of security'. 
Six months later, on 9 October, the two former Garuda 
officials were indicted. Indra Setiawan was charged with 
being an accessory to the murder on the grounds that he 
had assigned the pilot Pollycarpus to join Flight 97 4 on 
which Munir was travelling. The indictment accused him 
of being 'an accessory to the intentional and premeditated 
murder of Munir' and stated that he 'admitted that he 
issued the letter of assignment on the orders of the State 
Intelligence Agency (BIN) because Garuda was 
considered to be a strategic industry that needs to be 
protected by the agency'. 
In February this year, Indra Setiawan was found guilty 
by the Central Jakarta district court of 'assisting in a pre-
meditated murder' and sentenced to one year 
imprisonment. The other Garuda official taken into 
custody has since been released. 
The prosecutors told the court they had new evidence 
linking the pilot Pollycarpus to Munir's death. This 
included the taped recording of telephone conversations 
between Pollycarpus and Indra Setiawan, during the 
course of which they discussed a letter from a BIN official, 
M. As' ad asking the Garuda chief to assign Pollycarpus as 
aviation security officer on Flight 974. Pollycarpus also 
assured Indra Setiawan that 'our people' were well 
established within the state apparatus. Using . coded 
names, they talked about several high-ranking BIN 
officials, including an official, M As'ad, retired lieutenant-
general Hendropriyono wh6 was head of the agency at 
the time of Munir's murder and Muchdi PR wh'o was 
Hendropriyono's deputy and subsequently took over as 
the chief of BIN. 
During the trial of Pollycarpus in 2005, it was 
established that he had had no fewer than 41 telephone 
conversations with Muchdi PR. 
Commenting on the Supreme Court's decision to 
sentence Pollycarpus to 20 years for his role in the 
murder, a member of the Fact-Finding Team, Asmara 
Nababan said this verdict should pave the way for a probe 
into intelligence officials in connection with the case. 'Now 
that the ruling is out, the police can no longer stall the 
investigation into BIN officials like Muchdi and As'ad The 
verdict has set an ideal momentum for the police to 
proceed and step up their investigation," Asmara told the 
Jakarta Post. 
Unravelling the role of BIN 
It is widely believed that the case will not be satisfactorily 
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resolved until the person or persons behind the 
conspiracy are brought to justice. 
That may well have been facilitated by evidence 
produced during the Judicial Review regarding the role of 
BIN. Five witnesses testified about the link between 
senior Garuda officials and BIN agents. One witness, a 
low-ranking BIN agent, Raden Mohammad Patma Anwar, 
told investigators that he had been ordered by a superior 
to kill Munir before the presidential election in Indonesia in 
October 2004. 
Throughout the earlier and the more recent 
investigations, efforts to interrogate officials of BIN have 
been repeatedly thwarted . The only crack in the agency's 
blocking tactics came from Raden Anwar who also 
admitted during a court hearing that the agency did 
indeed plan to kill Munir. He confirmed that Pollycarpus 
was a BIN agent, which has been consistently denied by 
senior BIN officials. 
In February this year, the police announced that they 
were preparing to name new suspects. Usman Hamid, 
the former secretary of the Fact-Finding Team, told the 
press after a closed meeting with the national police crime 
investigation division, that the police have promised they 
will investigate everyone linked to the murder. 
Bringing the real culprits to justice 
On the third anniversary of Munir's death, Kontras, the 
human rights organisation set up by Munir in 1997, 
published a 75-page report 'Three Years Since the 
Murder of Munir, 2004 - 2007'. It concludes with a 
twenty-page chronology of events surrounding the 
murder investigations. 
The most striking feature in the chronology is the 
refusal of BIN officials to respond to requests to meet the 
Fact-Finding Team set up by the President in December 
2004. 
At the trial of Pollycarpus in 2005, it was established 
that he had been in frequent contact by phone with 
present and former top officials of BIN, in the weeks 
before Munir's fateful journey to Amsterdam. 
The chronology reveals that the chief of BIN in 2005, 
Syamsir Siregar, repeatedly denied that Pollycarpus was 
a BIN agent and rejected allegations that BIN was 
involved in the murder. The former chief secretary of the 
agency, Nurhadi Djazuli, refused to meet the Fact Finding 
Team on three occasions and issued a press release 
alleging that the team had no legal basis. Soon 
afterwards, he was asked by President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono to cooperate with the team but persisted in 
refusing to do so. 
Ultimately, Nurhadi did have a two-hour session with 
the team which concluded that BIN was involved in the 
murder. Another BIN official, Colonel Sumarno was 
contacted by the team at his office, after which they 
described his attitude as 'uncooperative' . 
The team then tried to meet Muchdi PR, the former 
deputy of BIN with whom Pollycarpus had had numerous 
phone conversations. Then came efforts by the team to 
meet retired Lieutenant-General Hendropriyono, the head 
of BIN at the time of the murder. He refused three 
requests for a meeting and even filed libel charges 
against two members of the team, Usman Hamid and 
Rachland Nashidik. 
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After Muchdi and Hendropriyono refused to meet the 
team three times, it decided to make no further attempts 
to meet them. It should be noted that all senior-ranking 
BIN officials are active or retired army officers and BIN 
stands out as an institution which has proven to be 
untouchable. With so much evidence against BIN now in 
the public domain, it remains to be seen whether those 
handling the Munir murder case will ultimately succeed in 
bringing the real conspirators to justice. 
Demonstration at BIN headquarters 
On 7 September last year, the third anniversary of Munir's 
death , a crowd of about one thousand people gathered 
outside the head office of BIN in Jakarta. They held aloft 
many posters. One carried the slogan, 'Justice for Munir' 
while other posters displayed photos of the present head 
of BIN, Syamsir Siregar, his deputy, M. As'ad, A.M. 
Hendropriyono and his deputy Muchdi Purwoprandjono. 
Speaking to the crowd from the top of a vehicle, 
Suciwati said: 'We have not come here for confrontation 
but to press for this agency to be cleansed . The person 
responsible (for the murder) must be brought to justice.' 
[Forum, 16 September 2007) 
In view of the verdicts passed by the Supreme Court 
in response to the Judicial Review, there is more reason 
to hope that the person or persons who were responsible 
for the criminal conspiracy to kill Munir will finally be 
identified and the guilty men brought to justice. 
Memorial lecture 
A Memorial Lecture to commemorate Munir's courageous 
work and reflect upon the difficult position of human rights 
defenders (HRDs) in Indonesia was given at the 
University of Utrecht, the Netherlands, on 13 September 
2007. It followed a similar Munir Memorial Lecture 
organised by the Solidarity Committee for Munir (KASUM) 
in Jakarta on 7 September. 
Munir was travelling to Utrecht to undertake a course 
of study at the university when he was murdered. 
The event was attended by Suciwati and Usman 
Hamid who provided an update on the case. The keynote 
speech was given by Asmara Nababan, executive 
director of DEMOS, the Center for Democracy and 
Human Rights Studies, Chairman of KASUM and former 
Secretary-General of Indonesia's National Commission 
on Human Rights, Komnas HAM. 
The opinion of the UN Secretary-General's Special 
Representative on Human Rights Defenders, Hina Jilani, 
following her visit to Indonesia in June 2007, that the 
prospects for the promotion of human rights had improved 
in the recent past provided the starting point for Asmara 
Nababan's address. 
Changes in state power structure needed 
While sharing the Special Representative's opinion about 
certain institutional and legislative developments, 
Nababan made the important point that ' ... until now there 
remains a lack of fundamental change in the power 
structure of the state that can provide real promotion, 
protection and fulfilment of human rights'. 
'If the reform and democratisation process in 
Indonesia fail to alter [the] state power structure into a 
more democratic one, the potential developments that Ms 
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Jilani has listed after her visit will remain unfulfilled.' The 
transformation of military power, or the lack of it, will be a 
key factor, he suggested. 
Without the necessary changes which should involve 
the establishment of the rule of law and the subjugation of 
the military to civilian supremacy, meaningful democracy 
will not be possible, he concluded. 
Nababan said violence against HRDs occurs in 
various forms, such as arbitrary arrests, assaults, forced 
disappearances, arbitrary killings, the dissolution of 
meetings, harassment, and criminalisation. He described 
the current situation of HRDs according to five categories 
of violations identified by the human rights NGO, 
lmparsial: 
The limitation or suspension of rights, such as 
freedom of expression and association, crucial to the 
work of HRDs; 
The misuse of the criminal law to prevent HRDs 
exercising their rights; 
Violations of the right to life and physical and/or 
mental integrity; 
Intimidation, slander and stigmatisation; and 
The lack of response to violations against HRDs 
resulting in impunity for the perpetrators. 
Nababan went on to identify the kinds of national and 
international instruments and mechanisms available for 
the protection of HRDs. 
He expressed reservations about the draft of 
Indonesia's new Criminal Code, which 'still contains 
various stipulations that can be misappropriated by the 
power holders to suppress freedom'. 
He noted that until now, Komnas HAM had played a 
negligible role in protecting HRDs. He urged HRDs to 
press Komnas HAM by continuously reporting cases of 
violations against HRDs and raising public awareness 
about its duties to protect them. A new body of 
commissioners, the fourth since the body's inception in 
1993, started work at the beginning of September 2007. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court to strike down 
the law establishing a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission [see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 185, p. 15] was a 
disappointment, but the ability of the Court to judicially 
review laws considered to be against the Constitution can 
be seen as progress, said Nababan. The Court has 
recently declared a number of repressive Articles in the 
Criminal Code unconstitutional: Articles 134, 136, and 
137 relating to the crime of insulting the head of state [see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No. 185, p. 21] and Articles 154 and 155, 
the notorious 'hate-sowing laws [see TAPOL press 
release, 'Continued detention of prisoners 
unconstitutional: Papuan activists must be released', 20 
July 2007]. 
Nababan urged the development of networking 
between national and international NGOs 'to guarantee 
exposure and extensive pressure in relation to human 
rights violation cases, especially those related to human 
rights defenders'. 
He concluded by reminding the audience that 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had stated the 
Munir murder was a test case for Indonesia: 
Continued on page 26 
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Burying the past in impunity 
TAP~L backgrounder on the lndonesia/Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship 
published February 2008 ' 
1. This backgrounder provides a brief summary of the 
work of the controversial Indonesia/Timar-Leste 
Commiss.ion of Truth and Friendship (CTF), which is due 
to report in February/March 2008. 
2. On 14 December 2004, the governments of 
lndon~si~ and Timor-Leste agreed to set up a 
Comm1ss1on whose objective, according to terms of 
reference subsequently concluded on 9 March 2005 is. 
"To e~tablish the conclusive truth in regard t~ the 
events prior to and immediately after the [Timor-Leste] 
popular consultation in 1999, with a view to further 
promoting reconciliation and friendship, and ensuring the 
non-recurrence of similar events." 
The two governments said that they had opted " ... to 
seek truth and promote friendship as a new and unique 
approach rather than the prosecutorial process." 
3. The CTF's membership, comprising five members 
each from both Indonesia and Timor-Leste, was 
announced on 1 August 2005: 
~rom Indonesia: Mr Benjamin Mangkudilaga (co-
cha1r), a former Supreme Court Justice; Mr Achmad Ali, a 
legal expert; Wisber Loeis, former director general of 
inte~national economic relations at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Mgr Petrus Turang, a West Timor bishop; and Mr 
Agus Widjojo, a military expert. 
From Timor-Leste: Mr Dionisio Babo Soares (co-
chair); Mr Jacinto Alves; Mr Aniceto Guterres; Ms 
Felicidade Guterres; and Mr Cirilo Cristovao. 
4. The Commission was mandated to review all 
materials documented by the Indonesian National 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in 
East Timor in 1999 (KPP HAM); the Ad-hoc Human Rights 
Court on East Timor; the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste 
(CAVR). 
5. Based in Denpasar, Bali, the CTF began work in 
August 2005, but did not conduct any public hearings until 
2007. Five hearings were then held in Indonesia 
(Denpasar, 19-20 February 2007; Jakarta, March 26-30 
2007; Jakarta 2-5 May 2007; Denpasar, 23-24 July 2007; 
and Jakarta, 24 October 2007) and one in Timor-Leste 
(Dili, 24-28 September). · 
6. Testimony was provided by a mixture of military 
personnel, militia leaders, public officials and victims. 
However, a disproportionate number of witnesses were 
alleged perpetrators and senior officials; victims were 
poorly represented.i A few high-profile witnesses 
including former Indonesian President, BJ Habibie, and 
Timor-Leste Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmao, gave 
testimony in closed sessions, drawing criticism from 
human rights NGOs who accused the CTF of violating the 
victims' right to transparency. 
7. The CTF was supposed to complete its work within 
one year, but following two extensions of its mandate, it is 
expected to submit its report in February or March 2008. 
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Mission, mandate and performance deeply 
flawed 
8. From the outset, the CTF was widely perceived as a 
mechanism designed to avoid international justice for 
gross violations of human rights perpetrated in Timor-
Leste. It was hastily conceived by the two governments 
when it became clear that the UN Secretary-General was 
int~nt on setting up a Commission of Experts (CoE) to 
review the progress made by serious crimes processes in 
Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The Timor-Leste 
government's agreement to participate in the CTF 
process because of its desire to foster good relations with 
its former occupier was strongly criticised by civil society 
and the Catholic Church in Timor-Leste. The CTF was set 
up without the approval of either Parliament or significant 
consultation with civil society. Human rights groups in 
Indonesia condemned it for perpetuating impunity and 
undermining Indonesia's commitment to uphold human 
rights. 
9. The CTF has since been severely criticised for 
major flaws in its mission, mandate, formation and 
performance. The strongest criticism has related to 
provisions in its terms of reference (ToR)ii which prevent 
the CTF from instigating prosecutions for serious crimes 
but empower it to recommend amnesties for perpetrator~ 
who cooperate in revealing the truth. One of the CTF's 
stated purposes, to provide 'definitive closure of the 
issues of the past', in reality appears to be aimed at 
burying the past. 
10. The section of the ToR that deals with 
reconciliation and rehabilitation empowers the CTF to 
'recommend rehabilitation measures for those wrongly 
accused of human rights violations'. By contrast, the 
rights of victims are virtually ignored since there is no 
similar provision for the rehabilitation for victims. Victims 
are not specifically mentioned throughout the whole ToR. 
International standards violated 
11. Notwithstanding the establishment of the CTF and 
statements by the two governments that the CoE was no 
longer necessary, the CoE was set up according to plan 
by the UN Secretary-General on 18 February 2005. Its 
report, published in July 2005, found that certain 
provisions in the CTF's ToR 'contradict international 
standards of denial of impunity for crimes against 
humanity'. It stated categorically that 'The Governments 
of Indonesia and Timor-Leste must realise that the United 
Nations do not condone amnesties regarding war crimes 
crimes against humanity and genocide'. The UN 
subsequently refused to testify at the CTF or take other 
steps to support its work unless the ToR were revised to 
comply with international standards.iii 
12. The CoE also raised questions about whether the 
CTF complies with relevant national legislation on 
reconciliation in the two countries.iv 
13. Numerous problems have arisen in relation to the 
procedures and performance of the CTF. They were 
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summarised in an open letter dated 23 May 2007 to the 
presidents of Indonesia and Timor-Leste by a worldwide 
coalition of three dozen human rights groups, including 
TAPOL: 
a) A lack of legitimacy attributable to three main 
factors: the perception that the CTF was established to 
avoid calls for an international criminal tribunal to try those 
accused of crimes against humanity in Timor-Leste in 
1999; the failure to address crimes committed before 
1999; and the amnesty provision, which would allow 
perpetrators of serious crimes to avoid accountability. 
b) The absence of any clear procedure for 
reviewing existing evidence about the violence in 1999 in 
order to arrive at a consensus about the truth, especially 
since key Indonesian government institutions have failed 
to provide relevant records. 
c) Serious deficiencies in the public hearings, 
including obvious biases on the part of some 
commissioners; the introduction of testimony irrelevant to 
the Commission 's mandate; the absence of any means 
for cross-checking testimonies against facts established 
by previous processes or actual evidence; conflict 
between Indonesian and Timor-Leste Commissioners; 
lack of assistance and protection for victims who testify; 
the ad hoc nature of witness testimonies; an imbalance of 
representation between victims and perpetrators; and the 
use of the public hearings as a forum for perpetrators to 
continue to blame the United Nations and other actors for 
the violence. 
d) Lack of transparency, clarity and a clear 
timetable for the Commission 's work. 
UN urged to carry out Timor-Leste justice 
mandate 
TAPOL has called upon the UN to play a part in ending 
the lawlessness that culminated in the attempted 
assassinations of Timor-Leste's President Jose Ramos-
Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao [see 
separate article] by acting on its mandate to further the 
cause of justice for serious crimes. 
It has questioned why the UN Security Council's 
mission to Timor-Leste, known as UNMIT, has failed to 
carry out its mandate to investigate serious crimes 
committed in 1999 when Timor-Leste voted for 
independence from Indonesia. 
"The Security Council's commitment to peace, 
democracy and the rule of law has been seriously 
undermined by UNMIT's failure to meet its 
responsibilities regarding justice and accountability" 
said TAPOL in a joint letter with the Catholic 
development agency, Progressio sent to UK Foreign 
Office Minister, Meg Munn on 13 February [available at 
http ://ti nyu rl . com/2qzrc6) . 
"This had led to diminished respect for the rule of law 
and an expectation that violence of the kind witnessed 
this week will go unpunished," the organisations said in 
a statement. 
They asked why it has taken nearly 18 months for 
UNMIT to start preparing plans for investigations and 
negotiate an agreement with the Timor-Leste 
. government. 
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No transitional justice benefits 
14. A detailed report on the CTF by the International 
Center for Transitional Justice, Too Much Friendship, Too 
Little Truth ,v published in January 2008 further elucidates 
the problems and concludes: 'The CTF has not yet 
delivered substantial transitional-justice benefits, and its 
public hearings have seriously compromised the goals of 
truth and reconciliation. Many of the Commission 's 
failings to date have their origins in the motivation and 
methods of the CTF's creators, as well as fundamental 
weaknesses in the Commission's Terms of Reference. 
These pre-existing problems were compounded by the 
poor design and inadequate preparation of the public 
hearing process.' 
15. Ironically, the CTF may not be in a position to 
exercise its controversial mandate to recommend 
amnesties because there have been no admissions of 
responsibility or efforts to cooperate in revealing the truth 
by Indonesian military personnel. Most testimonies have 
been self-serving attempts by alleged perpetrators to 
portray a false historical narrative of the violence by laying 
the blame on the United Nations and conflicting Timorese 
factions. Some testimony by militia leaders at the Dili 
hearings has, however, blamed the military and 
implicated generals in the supply of weapons and 
financial aid to pro-Indonesia Timorese.Vi 
16. The prospects for a report that ascertains the truth 
about the destruction of Timor-Leste, and the violence 
that in 1999 alone resulted in over 1,400 people being 
Continued on back page 
According to the Security Council resolution that 
established UNMIT in August 2006, a team of 
experienced personnel was supposed to resume the 
investigative functions of the former Serious Crimes Unit 
(SCU) which ceased to fundion in May 2005. 
TAPOL and Progressio point out that the UNMIT 
mandate was itself a minimal commitment. It did not 
include support for prosecutions and trials despite the 
fact that more than 70 per cent of those indicted by the 
SCU have not been prosecuted and remain free in 
Indonesia. 
The mandate also ignored recommendations by the 
UN's own Commission of Experts (CoE), and the UN-
established Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR). 
"The complete lack of progress by UNMIT 
demonstrates that justice and accountability cannot be 
achieved by less than half-hearted commitments and 
efforts," the letter said. 
The UN Secretary-General's latest report on UNMIT 
was considered by the Security Council on 21 February. 
It agreed to extend UNMIT's mandate by a further 12 
months. Several speakers drew attention to the need 
for accountability for past crimes. TAPOL urges the 
Security Council to consider how if can fulfil its 
responsibility for justice by re-visiting the 
recommendations of the CoE and holding a debate on 
the findings and recommendations of the CAVR as a 
matter of urgency. 
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JUSTICE & IMPUNITY 
Balibo Five deliberately killed, says coroner 
An inquest into the deaths in October 1975 of five journalists including two Britons who died in 
Balibo, a village on the border between East Timor and Indonesia's West Timor has ruled that the 
killings were deliberate and should be considered for possible war crimes prosecution. The 
inquest was held at the request of the sister of one of the journalists. Meanwhile, more has come 
to light about the British cover-up of the journalists' deaths 
The five journalists from Australia , Great Britain and 
New Zealand had travelled from Dili to the border village 
of Balibo to record the activities of Indonesian troops who 
were thought to be preparing for an act of aggression 
against East Timar (now Timor-Leste). This was two 
months before Indonesia launched its invasion on 7 
December 1975 of what was then Portuguese Timar. 
The inquest was conducted at the Glebe Coroner's 
Court in New South Wales by Dorelle Pinch after it had 
been established that such an inquest could be held 
there, because one of the victims, Brian Peters, was a 
resident in the State of New South Wales. 
The five journalists were Malcolm Rennie and Brian 
Peters of the UK, Greg Shackleton and Tony Stewart of 
Australia and Gary Cunningham of New Zealand. 
Malcolm Rennie and Brian Peters were working for 
Australia's Channel Nine, while the other three were 
working for Australia's Channel Seven. 
Ever since the tragedy, Indonesia has insisted that the 
men died 'in crossfire'. The coroner's efforts to seek the 
co-operation of Indonesia during the course of the inquest 
were ignored. 
In the words of the coroner: 'The Balibo Five died in 
Timor-Leste on 16 October 1975, from wounds sustained 
when (they) were shot and or stabbed deliberately, and 
not in the heat of battle, by members of the Indonesian 
special forces, including (Commander) Christoforus da 
Silva and Captain Yunus Yosfiah on the orders of Captain 
Yunus Yosfiah to prevent (them) from revealing that 
Indonesian special forces had participated in the attack 
on Balibo.' 
Although she was bound by law not to name particular 
persons who had committed criminal offences, the 
coroner said: 'There is strong circumstantial evidence that 
those orders emanated from the head of the Indonesian 
Special Forces, Major-General Benny Murdani to Colonel 
Dading Kalbuadi, Special Forces Group Commander in 
Timar and then to Captain Yosfiah 
While both Murdani and Kalbuadi are now dead, 
Yunus Yosfiah is s.tili alive. He was the . minister of 
information in the Habibie government in 1998 and is now 
living in retirement in Indonesia. The other named officer, 
Christoforus da Silva, is also still alive 
The coroner also recommended that the Australian 
and Indonesian authorities work together to find the 
remains of the five men for repatriation. {After the men 
were killed, their bodies were apparently burned and 
buried in a single grave in a cemetery on the outskirts of 
Jakarta.) 
Brushing aside the findings when they were made 
public last November, a spokesperson of the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry said that for Indonesia, it was a 'closed 
case'. 'We are still in the position that they were killed 
because of crossfire between conflicting sides at the 
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time.' 
Maureen Tollfree, the sister of Brian Peters, said the 
outcome of the inquest was 'absolutely wonderful. They 
were killed in cold blood . It was just a matter of getting 
someone to listen and help us. The families of the victims 
are feeling like me. I am shell-shocked.' John Milkins, the 
son of Gary Cunningham described the findings as 
'immensely important and courageous. I think it is the first 
step in what has been a very long journey. And the words 
"war crimes" are going to echo in Australian history for 
quite some time .'i 
The coroner said that she had referred the case to the 
federal authorities for possible war crimes prosecutions. 
An act of aggression 
Indonesian journalist Aboeprijadi Santoso wrote that 
while little new had emerged from the inquest, 'it 
established a much stronger case based on detailed 
evidence and witness testimony. The Indonesian 
government needs to respond to this seriously.' 
The coroner heard evidence from eleven key 
witnesses, including former Australian Prime Minister, 
Gough Whitlam as well as testimony heard behind closed 
doors from an Australian intelligence officer who 
intercepted messages between Canberra and Jakarta 
Santoso wrote that Balibo 'really marked the very start 
of Indonesia's bloody adventure in East Timar .. .. At stake 
was that the outside world would be fully aware of 
Indonesia's interest in intervening in East Timar, i.e. to 
wage a secret war that would turn the short-lived local 
civil war into a prolonged one as a result of infiltration and 
attack which began in 'Balibo on the fateful day of Oct. 16 
1975.'ii 
The President of Timor-Leste, Jose Ramos-Horta 
urged the Indonesian government to apologise and take 
responsibility for the killing of six journalists, including an 
Australian, Roger East, who was killed in Dili on 7 
December 1975, the day of the invasion. He expressed 
the hope that the government of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono would acknowledge the misconduct of 
members of the Indonesian army.iii 
A 'disgraceful cover-up' by the UK 
Although two British journalists were among the five 
journalists killed in East Timar on 16 October 1975, the 
British government has failed as yet to show any intention 
of taking up the issue with the Indonesian authorities by 
calling for the extradition of the man named in the 
coroner's verdict as being responsible for the deaths. Its 
response has been to leave the matter to the Australian 
Attorney-General. 
On 27 February this year, an adjournment debate took 
place in the House of Commons on the initiative of Don 
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Foster MP, seeki ng an explanation of the British 
government's 'disgraceful cover-up of the murder of the 
Balibo Five'. 
'When Britons die abroad we anticipate our 
Government doing all they can to help the relatives. We 
expect the Government to seek as much information as 
possible and to share it with the relatives. Sadly, in this 
case, the opposite happened. From 1975 until 1995, there 
was almost complete inaction . The Government were 
involved in a disgraceful cover-up.' 
The MP quoted at length from the coroner's findings 
regarding the way the two British journalists had been 
deliberately killed by Indonesian forces. According to Mr 
Foster, such an inquest could have been held long ago 
'had our Foreign Office told the British families in 1975 
and 1976 what it really knew from its own sources and 
from Ramos-Horta about the deaths at Balibo'. 
He referred to the coroner's conclusion that an 
international conflict was under way once Indonesian 
forces seized territory in East Timer on 7 October 1975. 
This meant that thereafter, the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949) 
protected journalists and that under the Convention, the 
killings were 'grave breaches under Article 147 and may 
be prosecuted as war crimes'. 
Stressing that the coroner's finding 'helps us to have a 
better understanding of the role of others, including the 
British and Australian governments at the time', it went on 
to state that 'in 1975, despite the Balibo murders, the 
Australian Government continued the charade required to 
sustain the myth that there were no Indonesian troops in 
East Timer.' 
'Britain had a key role in that myth,' he went on. 'On 
15 September 1975, a month before the deaths of the 
Balibo Five, John Ford, our ambassador to Jakarta 
reported to the FCO that Indonesia's generals planned to 
step up clandestine intervention designed to look like 
popular uprisings. The only limitation to clandestine 
activity now appears to be fear of its exposure.' 
According to Mr Foster, the FCO had advised the 
Australians on 2 October 1975 'that the UK Government 
would not protest over the subsequent Indonesian action 
in East Timer. Two days later, in a telegram from the 
ambassador to the FCO and the Ministry of Defence, Mr 
Ford described the military forces ready to invade East 
Timer. He added that Indonesia's Defence Ministry 
awaited 'incidents in the next few days that would 
persuade Indonesia's President to authorise "early overt 
action'" In other words, 'Britain did nothing to prevent the 
planned invasion and went further by recommending that 
it be kept covert. Keeping something covert means 
keeping journalists out of the way. 
According to the coroner, 'from early October 1975, 
the Indonesians were 'highly sensitive to the presence of 
any journalists ... in the border area.' 
Posing the question: 'What did the British Government 
do to uncover the truth' the MP recalled that during a 2006 
debate in the House, the then Minister implied that the 
Government were not aware of the deaths until the 
embassy's report on 24 October 1975. He said that 
comments were being made that reduced any need for 
further investigation, 'but worse, it seems that we did not 
want to know any more'. Our own ambassador suggested 
that 'we should ourselves avoid representations to the 
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Indonesians about them to which the FCO replied , "We 
agree."' 
A policy that 'paid off handsomely' 
A later dispatch from the ambassador to the FCO 
regarding East Timer said that Britain's policy 'has so far 
paid off handsomely. The lack of involvement has largely 
kept Timer out of the British and US headlines and away 
from becoming a major public issue.' 
After describing the events leading up to the deaths 
and pointing out that Yunus Yosfiah, then a captain in the 
Indonesian army was promoted to the rank of general 
after undergoing diplomatic training in Britain, Don Foster 
asked whether the Foreign Minister would endorse the 
coroner's report and invite the Indonesian government to 
endorse it. He asked whether the Minister would accept 
that Brian Peters' sister had beat a Foreign Office 
smokescreen to obtain an inquest and whether the 
Government would institute a fundamental review of the 
FCO's conduct on this case.iv 
Government's response 
Foreign Minister Meg Munn said that the British 
Government was 'following closely the Australian inquest 
and had remained in close contact with the relatives of 
Brian Peters. She said that FCO files from the period 
indicate that 'our Government's policy was not to 
intervene directly in the controversy surrounding the 
future of East but to engage the Indonesian Government 
on the need for democratic outcomes.' 
When Don Foster asked whether it was the Minister's 
intention to urge the Director of Public Prosecutions to 
bring prosecutions, the Minister said: 'It is not for the 
United Kingdom Government to take forward the findings 
of the coroner's proceedings in Australia or to comment 
on their accuracy.' 
She drew attention to Britain's policy of not 
recognising the Indonesian annexation of East Timer, but 
failed to record that investigations many years later by a 
UN commission concluded that as many as 183,000 
Timorese had died during the Indonesian occupation 
i Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November 2007. 
ii The Jakarta Post, 29 November 2007 
iii Tempo magazine, 3 December 2007 
iv Hansard, 27 February 2008. 
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'Indeed it is true, the case and how it is handled is a 
barometer to gauge whether Indonesia has truly 
reformed in terms of eradicating serious crimes that 
involve misappropriation of state powers. This is a test 
that shall show to what extent is the willingness and 
ability of Indonesia to finally sever the chain of impunity. 
It is my hope and I am sure it is a hope shared by anyone 
concerned with the promotion and protection of human 
rights, wherever they are, that Indonesia shall finally pass 
the test.' 
[A copy of Asmara Nababan's speech is available from TAPOL] 
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TIM OR-LESTE 
The continuing crisis in Timor-Leste 
The attack on President Jose Ramos-Horta on 11 February represented a low point in a series of 
disruptions that have engulfed Timor-Leste. Seriously injured, Ramos-Horta, Nobel Peace 
Laureate, was flown to Darwin and underwent four operations to remove several bullets from his 
body. On the day of the attack, the leader of the rebels, Major Alfredo Reinado was shot dead by 
members of the presidential guard. Other rebels had succeeded in ambushing the President on 
his way home from a morning jog. 
Another group of rebels under Lieutenant Gastao 
Salsinha attempted to ambush Prime Minister Xanana 
Gusmao. He escaped unscathed but his car was riddled 
with bullets. His private residence was also attacked. 
Later that day, he declared a state of emergency. 
Ana'lysts and Timar experts believe that the 24-year 
occupation by the Indonesian military has created a 
culture of violence and impunity. Since 2006 when the 
latest round of violence first began, the country, especially 
the capital Dil i, has been engulfed in many eruptions of 
violence. There have been clashes between street gangs 
supported by police or military elements, or clashes 
between the police and the military. Violence has played 
a major part in the attempts to solve the political crisis. 
The attack on Xanana and Ramos-Horta was more 
than just a failed coup. It was a manifestation of the failure 
of the several governments in Timor-Leste since 1999 to 
create a country whose citizens feel secure and where 
peace and stability prevail. Successive administrations -
under the UN from 1999 and, post-independence, under 
Prime Ministers Mari Alkatiri and Ramos-Horta from 2002 
- must share responsibility for failing to meet the 
population's basic economic and political needs. 
The military rebeUion 
The military rebellion in 2006 was just the tip of the 
iceberg and certainly not the most important part of the 
political crisis. However, the rebellion has been 
symptomatic of the crisis because political leaders without . 
exception have been unable to handle it. 
The roots of the rebellion go back to early 2006 when 
404 soldiers of the small defence force (FDTL) started 
complaining about discriminatory practices against 
members of the force who originate from the western 
areas of the half-island. Roque Rodrigues, a man with 
little influence who was then minister of defence; was 
unable to deal with the rebellion . However, the FDTL 
commander, Brig.General Taur Matan Ruak favoured 
strong measures. Eventually it was Prime Minister Mar,i 
Alkatiri who decided to take firm action against the 
rebellion. 
The conflict escalated when 177 more soldiers joined 
the rebellion. This reduced the FDTL force to 1,500 men. 
Although there were several rebel leaders, it was Lt. 
Gastao Salsinha who emerged as the strongest voice 
against the government. The response of Prime Minister 
Alkatiri was to dismiss the 581 soldiers, who had refused 
to return to barracks. These men then fled to . the 
mountains, taking their guns and ammunition with them. 
This rebellion marked the commencement of a major 
upheaval in Dili and in other major towns. 
It was also the moment when there was an upsurge of 
general dissatisfaction among the population about rising 
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prices of basic goods and burgeoning unemployment 
among the youth . A number of demonstrations crippled 
the government and rendered ,government departments 
and other government institutions virtually ineffective. In 
May 2006, members of the military police under Major 
Alfredo Reinado joined the military rebels and emerged 
as their leading voice. 
The then president Xanana Gusmao publicly voiced 
his disagreement with the decision by the Alkatiri/Fretilin 
government and the army commander Brig. General 
Matan Ruak to sack members of the army; he waged a 
high-profile campaign against the government, thus 
drawing attention to the deep rift that had emerged 
between Xanana and Mari Alkatiri. 
Popularity of the rebel movement 
Major Alfredo Reinado, the rebel leader, became very 
popular among the Timorese. To a large degree this was 
because his experiences were typical of the tribulations 
endured by the Timorese for the past three decades. 
In 1975, when he was eleven years old, his family 
joined the resistance forces and witnessed the suffering , 
hunger and violence caused by the military occupation. 
Reinado's uncle, Vitor Alves, was a Fretilin leader. During 
the many re-:locations of the resistance, Alfredo became 
separated from his mother and was captured. He was 
used as a TSO (Tenaga Bantuan Operasi, auxiliary force) 
and became a porter for the military. He was taken to 
Sulawesi by an Indonesian army sergeant as his house 
boy but managed to escape. He went back to Timar, was 
reunited with his mother and became active in the 
resistance movement with his uncle. 
In 1995 Reinado was able to leave Timor-Leste by 
boat and became a popular figure among the Timorese 
refugees in Australia. He lived in Perth for four years, 
married and had several children. In 1999 he returned to 
Timar where his previous shipping experience put him in 
a favourable position to command the country's two 
patrol-boats which represented the entire fleet of the 
Timorese navy. He was then sent to Australia for training 
at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra. 
He later became one of officers to lead the country's new 
military police within the FDTL. 
On 16 March 2006 the Alkatiri government dismissed 
591 members of the military (known as the petitioners 
because of the petition they wrote complaining about 
discrimination and other grievances). But by that time, it 
was clear that the crisis had become too deep to contain . 
In April the conflict escalated when petitioners , strea.t 
gangs and unemployed youngsters started burning cars 
and houses and looting shops. 
On 3 May Major Reinado, who still held an official 
position, was instructed to hunt down the petitioners. 
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In.stead he abandoned his post and joined them, together 
with other military police and some police officers. During 
this first period of the rebellion the general impression 
was that Reinado was siding with the Xanana camp in the 
political conflict. 
He had became a symbol of the disenfranchised 
including those who organised themselves in street gang~ 
in the poorer neighbourhoods. After his death in Dili in 
Febr~ary, his funeral was attended by a large and highly 
emotional crowd of some 2,000 people. His death may 
well have turned him into a martyr. 
On 2 March it was announced in Dili that one of the 
seventeen people suspected of involvement in the 
shooting of Ramos-Horta had surrendered to the 
authorities. Amaro da Costa turned himself in, saying that 
he wanted to help restore stability in the country. It is too 
early to assess the consequences of this defection. 
Dwifungsi emerges in Timor Leste 
Some of the characteristics of the Reinado rebellion can 
be compared to the dissatisfaction of the Indonesian 
military in the fifties and sixties. Many officers saw 
themselves as the main force that won independence for 
Indonesia and began to feel frustrated when civilian 
politicia~s proved unable to create economic wellbeing . 
Arm~ officers at the centre and also in the regions staged 
~ series of re~ellions and established a tradition of military 
1~v~lvem~nt in state and political affairs. In the early 
s1xt1es this became part of a military doctrine known as 
~wifungsi (Dual Function) legitimising military 
involvement in politics. It culminated in General Suharto's 
seizure of power from President Sukarno. 
A similar situation is developing in Timor-Leste. The 
petiti?~ers may well have had every justification for filing 
a pet1t1on of grievances. It was when negotiations with the 
government broke down that the rebellion started and it 
became increasingly political when the government 
refused to engage in meaningful dialogue. 
The attack on Ramos-Horta and Xanana, the most 
senior members of the government, could have been 
seen by the rebels as a shortcut to achieve their political 
demands and as such could be regarded as an attempted 
coup d'etat. 
The situation had previously deteriorated because the 
camps of Alkatiri and Xanana had their favourites within 
the army and police force. Both sides would appear to 
have been compromised, thereby losing the legitimacy to 
maintain law and order. 
A few unanswered questions remain . It is a fact that 
both Xana~a and Ramos-Horta established friendly 
contacts with the rebels ; Major Alfredo Reinado had 
several encounters with them both of them. However, 
during Xanana's premiership, relations turned sour as it 
became clear that he could not or would not give in to the 
demands of the petitioners. 
Ramos-Herta's position was quite different. He 
persisted in trying to find a solution through dialogue. It 
seems that, in his final encounter with Reinado, they 
reached some form of agreement. As yet, Ramos-Horta 
still under treatment in Australia, has not been able to giv~ 
his version of what happened. 
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Jose Ramos-Horta and Alfredo Reinado together one 
month before the attack 
A short account of the rift 
As early as 1987 the rift between Alkatiri and Xanana 
became apparent when the latter declared the creation of 
a national union in the mountains. Xanana was at the 
time leader of the Fretilin resistance as well as 
commander-in-chief of Falintil, its armed wing. The new 
umbrella was called CNRM, later renamed CNRT 
(National Council for the Timorese Resistance). It 
managed to bring the Catholic Church and the new 
generation of Timorese, who had grown up during the 
Indonesian occupation, under the CNRT umbrella. Falintil 
then became independent. However, these developments 
led to a number of grievances because Fretilin had lost its 
vanguard role. 
Xanana went a step further when he left Fretilin and 
proclaimed that he was as the sole leader of the 
re~istance . The Fretilin rank-and-file were unhappy with 
this although they were well aware of the importance of 
the CNRT nationally and internationally. Xanana became 
a figure above all parties, often to be compared with 
Nelson Mandela. Several Fretilin members including 
Ramos-Horta, one of its founders who was then living in 
Sydney, joined forces with Xanana and became his 
spokesperson abroad. 
In ~ovember 1992, Xanana was arrested by 
Indonesia and sentenced to 20 years in jail. He was able 
to ~esume his leadership from behind prison bars, 
ass1ste~ by many young Timorese, by sympathetic 
Indonesians and a network of international solidarity 
workers. An Australian woman, Kirsty Sword, who later 
became his wife, also helped him during his incarceration. 
. As ~he issue of Timor-Leste became a major 
international campaign, it was clear that a political 
solution was the only acceptable means to end the 
occupation of Timor-Leste. 
Referendum and independence 
Events escalated quickly after the fall of Suharto in May 
1998. In January 1999, Acting President, B.J. Habibie 
an~ounced a decision to give the East Timorese the 
?pt1on of autonomy within the Indonesian republic or 
independence. When the referendum was held in August 
1999, 78 per cent of the Timorese opted for 
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independence. 
In the years before independence, the Indonesian 
army had recruited and trained local pro-Indonesia 
groups. In 1998 and 1999, several of these militia groups 
creatted an atmosphere of terror through acts of 
intimidation and violence. After the vote in favour of 
independence, the Indonesian military had no option but 
to retreat, but nursing a strong feeling of revenge, they, 
together with the militia, went on the rampage . A 
scorched-earth campaign was launched during which 
some 70 per cent of houses and infrastructure in the 
country was destroyed and up to 1,500 people were 
killed. 
Timor-Leste then became the first country to be 
directly administered by the UN (UNTAET, the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor) which governed 
the territory from 1999 till 2002. In 2002 Timor-Leste 
became the first country to gain independence in the 21st 
century. 
Before this, general elections had been held under UN 
auspices in August 2001. As expected Fretilin won 57 
percent of the votes, partly because of its name 
recognition but more so because of its structural base 
among the population. Other parties that had existed 
since Portuguese times such as UDT and APODETI were 
virtually eliminated . Several new parties, including the 
PSD (Social Democratic Party) and the PD (Democratic 
Party) emerged as parties enjoying support from the 
younger generation. 
Meanwhile, the position of Xanana became rather 
controversial. Although he had been the resistance 
leader, he had no political vehicle of his own and was 
therefore unable to stand in the elections. But the April 
2002 presidential elections gave him the opportunity he 
needed and he acheived a landslide victory wi_th 82 per 
cent of the votes. But under the ministerial system in 
force , the Prime Minister became the head of government 
while the President was largely a ceremonial head. 
Hence, although Xanana's political ambitions were 
considerable, his powers were very limited. 
·From the very, the new Fretilin government faced · 
difficulties, not least because of the eruption of events on 
the streets. In December 2002, there were a number of 
riots in Dili during which Alkatiri's private home was burnt 
down. Later, in 2005, the Catholic Church organised a 
two-week demonstration pro_testing against government 
policies. Its main grievance was the government's 
decision to reduce the role of religion in the educational 
system. 
The fall of the Alkatiri government in 2006 was another 
low point. The problems confronting the country had 
mounted. In addition to a number of riots, the government 
came under strong pressure from Xanana. Alongside the 
poor performance of government institutions was the fact 
that the rebels were still active in the mountains. These 
mounting problems forced Alkatiri to step down as the 
head of government. A country that a few years earlier 
had been hailed as the UN's poster child of nation-
building, joined the ranks of the many unstable, . 
developing nations where a legitimate elected 
government had been toppled. It was also clear that 
Xanana had actively supported the overthrow of the 
Fretilin government. 
The 2006 elections displayed all the hallmarks of a 
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country in crisis. Timorese political leaders lost a lot of 
political clout because the vast majority of the people 
blamed them for the appalling economic conditions. "They 
haven't delivered" was the common complaint. The four 
political leaders, Xanana and Ramos Horta who were 
outside Fretilin and Alkatiri and Francisco Guterres (Lu 
Olo) as the two Fretilin leaders had all lost legitimacy. 
However, no new leaders had emerged to take their 
places. It may well take several years before a younger 
generation of politicians such as Fernando Araujo of the 
PD, or Arsenio Bano and Aniceto Gutteres of Fretilin can 
emerge from beneath the shadows of the older 
generation. 
With Xanana determined to seize power, but realising 
that he could no longer continue as an above-party figure, 
he set up a new pol itical vehicle called CNRT 
(resuscitating the old initials) which is less a party than a 
group of loyal supporters from the ranks of anti-Fretilin 
figures. 
Fretilin was by now much weaker, partly because of its 
poor performance during its time in government from 
2002 till 2006, but also because of the strong opposition 
of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, an internal group 
emerged within the party called Fretilin Mudanca under 
the leadership of Jose Luis Gutteres who wanted to find 
accommodation with Xanana and Ramos-Horta. 
Although weakened, Fretilin emerged from the 
general elections as the party with the largest number of 
seats in parliament with Xanana's CNRT taking second 
place. Although this was a political defeat for Xanana, he 
was able to cobble together a coalition called AMP 
(Majority Alliance) with a small majority of seats and was 
therefore able to form a new government. AMP has now 
been in power for over a year but seems to have been as 
ineffective as the previous governments. 
Squalid conditions 
Recent reports from Timor-Leste all describe woeful 
economic conditions. Unemployment remains very high 
while little has been done to help the population enjoy the 
fruits of independence. 
Since 1975, large numbers of Timorese have left the 
country in search of work or have become internally 
displaced. With each major upheaval, in 1975 and 
1998/99 but more so in the 2006 crisis, tens of thousands 
of people living in Dili have abandoned their homes. As a 
result, the capital is little more than a small undeveloped 
town and is now overwhelmed by squalid, refugee camps 
covering every patch of previously uninhabited space. 
Because the 2006 riots took the form of conflicts 
between easterners and westerners, Dili is now divided 
into segregated neighbourhoods, making the refugee 
problem more difficult to solve. In the first years after 
1999 many Timorese survived from handouts from 
international organisations or UN agencies. The 2006 
crisis led to a similar situation, this time with the World 
Food Programme introducing a large-scale programme 
reinforcing the negative tendency of dependency on 
handouts. 
Although the Fretilin government placed strong 
emphasis on education and health care, it failed to bring 
greater prosperity and employment. The present 
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The peace process in Aceh 
It is widely accepted that democracy is in a good shape in Aceh. The level of violence is low, the 
economy gives cause for optimism and post-tsunami development is generally on track. However, 
in a region devastated by three decades of conflict and the 2004 tsunami disaster, many things 
are not yet running well. It is instructive to see how its new political leaders have performed and 
how the reintegration of ex-GAM combatants is proceeding. 
Political analysts agree that democracy in Aceh is 
flourishing and is far ahead of other parts of Indonesia 
including Jakarta. Politically, Aceh underwent a kind of 
revolution: a speedy peace process resulting in the 
Helsinki Peace Agreement (Memorandum of 
Understanding, MoU), the implementation of the MoU 
and the UUPA (Law on the Governance of Aceh) adopted 
by the Indonesian Parliament, the DPR, in Jakarta, and 
successful local elections. As a result, Aceh is now well 
ahead in political reform in the post-Suharto era. 
On paper at least, the MoU created plenty of 
democratic space, ending authoritarian and centralist rule 
from Jakarta. This can be described as the most far-
reaching regional autonomy experiment in Indonesia. If 
well implemented, it could set an example for other 
regions. 
The victory of independent candidates at the local 
elections (pilkada) represented a dramatic break with 
New Order politics under Suharto . None of the 
candidates of the Jakarta political parties won posts of 
any significance, while independent candidates who were 
either associated or sympathised with GAM (Free Aceh 
Movement) secured the posts of governor, vice-governor 
and the majority of the district chief positions. 
Division of labour 
On paper the two top administrators, Governor lrwandi 
Yusuf and Vice-Governor Muhammad Nazar are 
inexperienced men. lrwandi studied veterinarian science 
in the US and was for several years GAM's underground 
representative in Jakarta. Nazar was chair of SIRA, the 
organisation that successfully campaigned for a 
referendum on the political future of Aceh from the late 
1990s till the time of the MoU. 
Both were arrested and given long sentences. lrwandi 
made a spectacular escape from prison during the 
tsunami in Banda Aceh while Nazar was released from 
prison in Malang, East Java as part of the MoU 
agreement. The two men scored convincing victories in 
the local elections, signalling the preferred choices of the 
electorate. 
The economy of Aceh was in bad shape, after three 
decades of war and the tsunami disaster which ravaged 
practically all parts of Aceh. Although the peace process 
was well underway, it was the tsunami that was the 
turning point and made Aceh headline news globally. 
Money came pouring in from all corners of the world for 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
Having been in opposition for years, both lrwandi and 
Nazar were well aware of the many challenges ahead. 
Their landslide victories raised the expectations of the 
Aceh electorate. For the first time since Indonesian 
independence in 1945, the Acehnese were able to 
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choose independent candidates. After taking office, the 
two men needed to identify the most urgent tasks: 
creating new opportunities in the economy and continuing 
political reform. 
lrwandi has focused on the economy while Nazar 
deals with Jakarta ministers and their departments. He 
has also focused on justice and human rights, including 
the establishment of a truth and reconciliation 
commission and a human rights court. The important 
issue of reintegration has been taken on by both men as 
it is an issue that will be crucial in judging whether their 
administration has successfully coped with the peace 
process. 
Economy, the key issue 
Governor lrwandi has placed the economy at the top of 
his agenda. He realises more than anyone that the 
political changes in Aceh should have a positive impact 
on the economy. Acehnese should feel the difference in 
their pockets, an increase in purchasing power and more 
opportunities for their families. 
Since taking office, lrwandi has made several 
overseas trips, to the US, India, Malaysia, Germany and 
Turkey to find potential investors. While he has been 
criticised for going abroad too often, his purpose was 
clearly to 'sell' Aceh to foreign investors. lrwandi made 
the front pages when he met billionaire George Soros 
who expressed an interest in investing in Aceh. 
Several initiatives have been taken by the lrwandi 
administration to strengthen the grassroots economy. 
Most ambitious is the plan to clear large areas of land for 
small holder palm oil production . Each family will be 
allocated four hectares while plans have also been 
initiated to end the isolation of inland villages by building 
roads to the coast. These efforts will boost the export of 
agricultural products to neighbouring countries. Several 
harbours will be built or repaired. The main ports of 
Sabang and Krueng Geukuh will be turned into container 
ports while Kuala Langsa, Krueng Geukuh, Krueng Raya 
and Labuhan Haji will also be developed for export trade. 
Among the many challenges is the rampant corruption 
which cannot be stamped out overnight. The Governor's 
efforts pose a threat to the Acehese elite. Political 
opposition and even sabotage could occur if his policies 
threaten their economic privileges. To overcome 
bureaucratic red tape, he has himself taken many 
decisions about projects involving former GAM 
compatriots as well Acehnese in the diaspora. 
But lrwandi cannot simply ignore the bureaucracy at a 
time when the budget for Aceh has increased by more 
than 600 per cent. Unless the money is handled properly, 
the consequences could be very damaging. He inherited 
a damaged war economy which cannot be transformed 
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overnight. The clearest example is illegal logging. Despite 
the moratorium on logging in Aceh announced last year, it 
is still going on, especially in South Aceh. 
The tsunami undoubtedly gave Aceh an economic 
boost. Around US$8 billion has so far been made 
available for reconstruction by the Indonesian 
government and foreign donors. Another US$6 billion will 
arrive in the next two years. Any visitor to Banda Aceh or 
Lhok Seumawe or the harbour of Sabang will be struck by 
the boomtown atmosphere. 
The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh agency 
(BRR) announced that, by the end of October, over 
100,000 houses had been rebuilt, although still short of 
the 120,000 target. Half of the 3,000 kilometres of 
destroyed roads have been re-surfaced, most 
administrative buildings in the districts and districts have 
been reconstructed, seven airstrips have been upgraded 
and three new ones built. 
Aceh has all the ingredients for a successful economy. 
It possesses oil and gas fields and because of the UUPA 
(regional autonomy) law, much of the revenues will go to 
the province. Rural Aceh is very fertile. In the central 
highlands some of the world's best Arabica coffee is 
grown while elsewhere, cocoa, rubber and palm oil 
plantations need to be revitalised . The Acehnese have a 
strong entrepreneurial tradition, and have made good use 
of their trading skills with neighbouring countries on the 
Malacca Straits. 
The thirty-year conflict devastated the economy. 
Around 169,000 people lost their lives during the tsunami 
in December 2004 and the infrastructure was badly 
damaged during the conflict and the tsunami. Aceh still 
lacks expertise in many sectors, which is why the new 
leaders are putting emphasis on education and allocating 
to it around one-third of the budget. 
Reintegration, a gigantic task 
Alongside the economy is the complex issue of 
reintegration. To safeguard any peace process, the 
reintegration of ex-combatants is critically important. This 
helps ex-combatants to return to normal social and 
economic life and means creating good jobs so that all the 
ex-combatants and the victims can return to their 
communities. Experience of post-conflict management 
has taught that failure of reintegration is a recipe for 
renewed conflict. Timor-Leste is one example. 
The Helsinki MoU made provision for reintegration, 
providing 'economic facilitation' for ex-combatants, 
amnesty for political prisoners and compensation for the 
victims. The emphasis on reintegration was one of the 
major achievements of the Helsinki-based CMI which 
brokered the peace process and also of AMM, the 
monitoring body composed of people from the EU and the 
ASEAN countries. From the start, the regional AMM 
offices have focused on handling the reintegration 
process. 
The BRR (Reintegration Fund) was set up in February 
2006 but from the outset, it faced virtually impossible 
tasks. In the first 18 months, it had two chairpersons. The 
present chair is Nur Djuli, a seasoned pro-independence 
campaigner who was a member of the GAM delegation in 
Helsinki. For many years, he was active in the Acehnese 
diaspora, particularly in Malaysia. 
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While the BRR is under the governor, the BRA is the 
responsibility of the government in Jakarta, a measure of 
its weakness but sometimes also its strength. Unlike other 
post-conflict situations, a pledge was made to give 
relatively large sums of money to several categories of 
those involved in the conflict. From an initial sum of 
US$150 million, GAM combatants were to be allocated 
$3,500 each while GAM non-combatants and ex-political 
prisoners got $US1 ,400; $700 was given to GAM 
members who surrendered before the peace agreement 
and $1,400 to former militia group members, the ones 
who sided with Jakarta and fought against GAM. Other 
projects provide housing assistance for those who lost 
their homes, medical assistance for the injured and 
compensation for families who lost relatives in the conflict. 
One of the major flaws of BRA is that it only provides 
financial compensation and does not deal with 
psychological needs. Research undertaken by the 
Harvard Medical School revealed high levels of trauma. 
The programme was greatly in excess of the agency's 
capacity. When about 600,000 people submitted 50,000 
requests, the agency's reputation suffered. Although 1it 
had been set up to compensate individuals, the GAM 
leadership (renamed KPA) insisted that the funds should 
be allocated by its local leadership. 
Complications also emerged within GAM. During the 
Helsinki talks, it was agreed that there were 3,000 
combatants but everybody knew this was a conservative 
figure. Many GAM guerrillas were villagers who 
participated in armed resistance on a part-time basis, 
returning home to work in their gardens. Moreover, when 
Indonesian troops launched major operations, GAM 
members sought refuge across the Malacca Straits. 
Some analysts said that there were just a few hundred 
combatants but the on-and-off armed wing was at least 
three times that. For obvious reasons GAM did not keep 
a membership list. The GAM leadership produced the 
figure of 3,000 for several reasons. As the movement was 
decentralised, they themselves did not know the exact 
figure. The decommissioning of weapons also meant . 
that, by giving a lower figure, GAM would need to hand in 
fewer weapons. Till now, it is not clear whether local GAM 
units still possess a large stock of arms but with the 
restoration of peace, armed resistance has been 
rendered meaningless. 
There were lengthy discussions on reintegration not 
only among the Acehnese organisations but also among 
international organisations such as the International 
Organisation for Migration, the World Bank, foreign 
embassies and the EU delegation in Aceh. Everybody 
was aware of the importance of reintegration in 
guaranteeing the peace process. Schemes were devised 
to combine individual handouts with efforts to use cash to 
set up cooperatives or small businesses. 
The BRA remains arguably the most sensitive part of 
the process; the appointment of Nur Djuli as the third 
person to head the agency was a political decision taken 
by the Governor. When cash runs short, other sources, 
usually foreign donors, have been asked to help. The Rp 
1.5 trillion allocated to mark the second anniversary of the 
MoU, was re-directed for use by the BRA. 
The achievements of the BRA are nonetheless 
impressive. Cash has been given to 3,000 ex-
~ combatants, 6,200 non-combatants and 3,204 people 
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who surrendered . Of the 2,035 ex-political prisoners, 
almost three-quarters have received compensation while 
6,500 registered ex-militia (PETA, Motherland 
Defenders), some 62 per cent of the total , have received 
money. Victims whose houses were burned, who were 
seriously injured or who needed medical treatment have 
also benefited from BRA activities. 
Housing construction has been less satisfactory. Of 
the 39,926 destroyed houses only 5,228 have been 
rebuilt, a mere 13 per cent. With BRA projects being so 
crucial, it cannot afford to fail but nor can it satisfy 
everybody. 
Political reform and new tensions 
Political changes have occurred at breathtaking pace, 
making it difficult to keep track. A new government with a 
new political agenda, the emergence of at least seven 
new local political parties , the changed political 
relationship between Jakarta and Banda Aceh, the big 
internal changes within GAM and lastly a rejuvenated civil 
society in Aceh all point to big changes of the political map 
of Aceh. 
The government with its new governor, many new 
district chiefs, mayors and deputies represents a break 
with the old Jakarta politics. Some analysts believe that 
not much has changed: the wine jugs are new but the 
contents haven't changed . Or, despite the change of 
leadership, nepotism and favouritism still persist. But the 
fact is that the new real politik in Aceh does differ starkly 
from the old politics from Jakarta . The emergence of new 
economic and political interest groups has created a 
transformed political and economic landscape. 
The old Aceh elite, strongly aligned to the political elite 
in Jakarta, have lost much of their economic and political 
clout. This has created new political tensions and the 
battle to preserve the old established forces continues to 
be a part of the political scene. The new power groups are 
often linked to GAM stalwarts, arguably a predictable 
phenomenon since political power is bou_nd to shift as the 
economy expands. Most GAM leaders have started up 
businesses which can provide jobs for unemployed ex-
combatants. 
The GAM organisational structure was largely 
decentralised with the leadership coming mostly from the 
Pidie region. The elections that catapulted lrwandi and 
Nazar to power have undermined this hierarchy and the 
mushrooming of new businesses has created new 
alliances. It is doubtful whether the old GAM leadership 
from Pidie can retain their position of dominance. 
New phenomenon, the birth of local parties 
The ability to form local political parties is something new; 
elsewhere in Indonesia, parties are required to have 
branches in a number of provinces. So far thirteen local 
parties have been set up, some Muslim and some 
secular. 
The first party to emerge long before the law on local 
parties was adopted was PRA (Partai Rakyat Aceh, Aceh 
People's Party) , set up by a young generation of activists 
which has attracted peasants , professionals, 
businessmen and NGO activists. The PRA opposes the 
introduction of sharia law and supports the principle of 
federalism in Indonesia. After a long period of preparation, 
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the PRA drew up a programme covering all sectors and is 
expected to perform well in the 2009 elections. Key pro-
democracy persons such as Nanda Thamrin, Ra ihana 
Diani and Aguswandi are members of the PRA. 
Soon after the PRA, other parties emerged. Partai 
Gab That, (Generasi Aceh Beusaboh Thaat dan Taqwa) a 
local Muslim party with a local Acehnese name in the 
tradition of the days of the Aceh Sultanate. Several 
groups were involved, students from Muslim schools, 
members of HUDA, the organisation of Muslim clergy, 
former GAM members and former SIRA members. A local 
GAM leader Abu Samalanga is its chair. Its political 
agenda is focused on Muslim ideals, including the 
introduction of shariah law. 
The next party to emerge was set up last March by 
women . Although the agenda is focused on the 
advancement of women , PARA (Partai Aliansi Rakyat 
Aceh Peduli Perempuan, the Aceh People's Party 
Alliance Concerned with Women), is chaired by Zulhafah 
Luthfi , a well-known woman activist, and Nurjanah, both 
academics. While PARA does not exclude men, most 
members of the board are women. 
PAAS (Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, the Acehnese 
Party for Peace and Welfare) came into being in June 
2007 initiated by intellectuals, politicians, professionals 
and activists from youth and women's organisations. One 
of the key organisers of PAAS is Ghazali Abas, an 
Acehnese politician, formerly a member of the MPR, the 
Indonesian Peoples' Congress. Ghazali Abas spoke out 
courageously about the many human rights abuses 
during the Suharto days. PAAS is likely to attract non-
GAM voters. 
Partai Serambi Persada Nusantara Serikat (PSPNS) 
was set up in June 2007 and uses the word serikat 
(federal) in its name, a word that unacceptable for 
centralists in Jakarta. Its chair is Muhammad Salihun and 
Alhadi Fuadi is the secretary-general. 
A few local parties about which there is not much 
information are Partai Darussalam, Partai Aceh Meudalat 
(PAM) , Partai Lokal Aceh (PLA), Partai Dau/at Aceh 
(PDA) and Partai Pemersatu Moslim Aceh (PPMA, Aceh 
Moslem Unifying Party). These parties hope to win 
support from Muslim voters, especially from people who 
may have voted in the past for Indonesian Muslim parties. 
They all registered in the last four months of 2007. 
Partai Bersatu Aceh (Unified Acehnese Party) is an 
interesting local party because its chair is Farhan Hamid, 
a national MP in Jakarta representing PAN, a non-
exclusive Muslim party. He appears to have concluded 
that he could lose his parliamentary seat if he were 
nominated by a national party. The secretary-general is 
Muhammad Saleh. 
Partai SIRA registered in February this year although 
it has existed since the early reform days after the fall of 
Suharto in 1998. SIRA was able to mobilise tens of 
thousands of people on the streets and politically it was 
often seen as the younger, non-violent sibling of GAM. 
This combination is reflected in the present power 
structure where lrwandi Yusuf became governor and 
Muh. Nazar became vice-governor both well known GAM 
and SIRA stalwarts. The chair of this party is Taufiq Abda 
and Arhama is the secretary-general. 
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The most important local party is undoubtedly Partai 
GAM, the political party that transforms GAM into a 
political party within the Indonesian state. It was set up on 
27 July 2007 in Banda Aceh. The people in charge explain 
this as a logical consequence of the peace process; 
whereas GAM formerly had a strong armed wing , it now 
will focus exclusively on political forms of struggle. The 
party has also said that it will continue to use the same 
flag and symbol as before. This explanation led to some 
dismay among decision makers in Jakarta. 
TNI officers rejected this decision while many 
politicians in Jakarta fear that the new party will win very 
substantial support in the forthcoming elections, leading 
to the demise of the national parties which have their 
headquarters in Jakarta. 
The existence of many local parties in Aceh has 
created a situation in which national parties have become 
rather meaningless. People in other provinces, especially 
Papua, are closely watching these developments while 
the political elite in Jakarta is far from happy. It may be 
some time before Partai GAM is acceptable to the 
authorities in Jakarta. 
Many politicians in Jakarta distrust GAM and fear it 
could resume the armed struggle but this has become 
increasingly unlikely. Most Acehnese are more than 
happy with the absence of violence and fear. The 
transformation of many GAM leaders into businessmen is 
a mark of the rapid switch from armed struggle to 
business. 
Internally, Partai GAM is encountering problems. It 
was set up primarily by the Pidie group, who consist of the 
older generation who were part of the exiled GAM 
government in Sweden. But the political map of GAM in 
Aceh has changed enormously. Since the local elections, 
most rank-and-file GAM members support the younger 
generation, represented by lrwandi and Nazar while. the 
old generation retains legitimacy because they were the 
ones who signed the MoU. However, the real power is 
clearly in the hands of lrwandi and his group. 
There are several scenarios for a political way out: the 
different wings could agree to remain together in a single 
party or the younger generation could set up their own 
party, while other GAM parties emerge, or "the SIRA 
group, which paved the way for the peaceful solution 
through a referendum in 1998 could emerge as a new 
political party. 
GAM Party changes its name 
After difficult negotiations with the Department of Law and 
Human Rights in Jakarta, GAM leaders agreed to change 
their name and symbol. Previously GAM was the 
abbreviation of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the Free Aceh 
Movement. After the Helsinki Peace Agreement, the 
leaders decided to keep GAM as their name but no longer 
as an abbreviation. It would simply be a way of 
recognition for the electorate. When officials in Jakarta 
rejected the idea, GAM leaders agreed that its name 
would once again be an abbreviation. The M now stands 
not for 'merdeka' (freedom) but for 'mandirl which means 
self-reliant. 
Previously, Malik Mahmud the former prime minister in 
exile in Sweden was named as their vote-getter but when 




the party made its application for recognition , Muzakkir 
Manaf, the last commander-in-chief of TNA, the armed 
wing of GAM, was named as the chair. The former flag 
with a crescent and star now contains the letters GAM, 
writ large, alongside Gerakan Aceh Mandiri. Now that 
these adjustments have been made, the local office of the 
Department of Law and Human Rights is more likely to 
endorse its registration. 
The new political landscape in Aceh provides many 
new features but a few certainties will remain . The GAM 
party(ies) will definitely win many votes, most likely a 
substantial majority. Pluralism is also a certainty: the 
variety of local party initiatives will guarantee that the 
many views among the Acehnese are represented. 
A soft version of shariah law? 
The introduction of shariah law a few years ago is a 
contentious issue but is unlikely to create major problems 
during the elections. The division between secular and 
religious parties in Aceh differs somewhat from conditions 
in Java. The more secular parties, including Partai GAM, 
will not take a strong position against shariah law. The 
intention is not to make a big issue of shariah law but to 
gradually turn it into a moral and educational issue, 
instead of being part of the judicial system. 
The new rulers of Aceh will make sure that shariah law 
will be used in moderation. Resistance against shariah 
law is quite strong in Aceh but if one starts to attack it 
frontally, it will create deep divisions in society. 
Throughout the history of Aceh, even during the Aceh 
Sultanate of the 17th century, shariah law was never 
needed. Islamic law and customary law were used to run 
the country. As yet, shariah law punishments such as 
caning have been applied in very few cases, for so-called 
indecency, adultery, thieving and petty gambling. Bigger 
cases such as corruption are handled by the criminal 
courts, meaning that shariah law is only used for petty 
crime. Some women activists have complained that the 
shariah police, a special unit of the Shariah Department, 
have intruded into their private lives by making judgments 
on whether women are 'properly' dressed. 
Pressing human rights issues 
While the peace process has proceeded relatively well, 
three human rights issues have not been properly dealt 
with . At a student seminar last August to mark the second 
anniversary of the MoU peace agreement, Vice-Governor 
Muhammad Nazar drew attention to the establishment of 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the 
creation of a Human Rights Court. He said that they had 
asked the central government in Jakarta to quickly draft 
regulations for a TRC, which should have been set up 
within one year, and also for the establishment of a 
human rights court. 
There is a tendency in post-conflict situations for 
nothing to be done about these matters . There is al~ays 
the likelihood of strong pressure from former perpetrators 
of acts of violence to disrupt the peace process, as 
exemplified in Indonesia. In post-Suharto Indonesia, 
efforts to set up a human rights court and a TRC were 
bogged down by disagreements in parliament. This has 
also happened in Aceh. While the MoU agreement 
Continued on back page 
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Banning beggars won't solve Jakarta's 
problems 
The decision by the Jakarta Municipal Administration to enact a bylaw banning beggars and street 
vendors from the city will do nothing to solve the problems facing the country's capital and will 
only intensify the scourge of poverty. It criminalizes the capital's 600,000 poor people and even 
makes it an offence for people to give money to beggars and street children. 
An announcement last September by Jakarta's 
outgoing governor, retired general Sutiyoso, that he was 
introducing a bylaw banning beggars and street vendors 
and making an offence of giving money to beggars has 
angered many organisations who argue that the law will 
only intensify poverty, already a huge problem in the city. 
The governor said the justification for the new law was to 
clean up the streets of the nation's capital and end 
disturbances to public order. Such remarks have led 
many who will be targeted to conclude that the governor 
does not care one bit about them. 
Street vendors, beggars and street children are a 
common sight everywhere in the capital , in a country 
where there are no unemployment benefits available from 
the state. People who are unable to find a job have to eke 
out a living with anything that will bring them something to 
keep body and soul together. In the absence of a social 
security system, hundreds of thousands of unemployed 
or semi-employed men and women must fend for 
themselves by using their own wiles on the streets. 
Research has shown that street vendors in Jakarta 
are very successful at doing this, earning a total of Rp. 35 
million (roughly $35) a day, according to the Institute for 
Ecosoc Rights.i The calculation is based on data from the 
city 's development planning agency in 2006 that 
concluded there are 141 ,071 registered street vendors. 
Many others make a small living as 'jockeys'. These are 
people who become 'passengers' in cars to help 
motorists conform with a regulation which requires cars 
using the toll roads to carry a minimum of three persons. 
The city bylaw will prohibit people from setting up 
businesses along the streets, sidewalks, pedestrian 
bridges and other communal areas, and will prohibit 
people from giving money to beggars, buskers and street 
children. Anyone giving money to beggars could be fined 
between Rp 100,000 and Rp 20 million or sentenced to 
two months in jail. 
Those also affected by the ban include so-called 'Pak 
Ogah' who help to direct the traffic at intersections in 
exchange for a tip from motorists stuck in the traffic. This 
highlights the absence of police who should be doing the 
job. 
The Poor People's Alliance strongly opposes the new 
bylaw because it would block the urban poor's ability to 
make a living for themselves and their families. 
A former busker who now works at the Jakarta Centre 
for Street Children , interviewed by Jakarta Post, said: 'No 
one wants to go begging for the rest of their lives. I will 
support the bylaw if the government can find people a 
job.' ii 
Nurcholis Hidayat of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute 
said the law was a violation of citizens' rights. 'Public 
order officials often use violence to organise street 
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vendors, beggars, buskers and sex workers. But these 
people are only trying to look for money, ' he said. 
Other Indonesian cities record a very similar situation. 
In Surakarta, Central Java, for example, some 20 per 
cent of the city's population of 550,00 live in poverty. 
According to data from the city's Sidewalk Vendors' 
Management Agency, at least 30,000 people or 25 per 
cent of the city's poor, rely on 5,617 sidewalk stalls for 
their living. 
M. Ridha Saleh , deputy chairman of the newly-
installed Komnas HAM, the National Human Rights 
Commission, which has received many complaints about 
the Jakarta bylaw, said the Commission would summon 
the city administration to ask why they were trying to 
undermine people's rights to live in the city and would set 
up an evaluation team to assess the performance of city 
officials. 
The Department of the Interior could step in and ask 
the Jakarta administration to revise the bylaw if it 
contradicts a law passed by a higher body or violates the 
country's Constitution. However, according to the Straits 
Times (9 October 2007), Interior Minister Mardiyanto has 
indicated that the bylaw does not violate other laws, 
setting the stage for its implementation. 
Wardah Hafidz of the Urban Poor Consortium was 
angry with such an attitude. 'High-handed approaches 
like this in order to cover up poverty in the city just do not 
work. It only shows that our system only serves those 
with money and power and neglects the rights of the 
poor.' iii 
The scourge of poverty 
While the Indonesian economy has been recording a 
level of growth that has won the commendation of the 
World Bank and domestic and foreign investors are 
showing greater interest in the economy as compared to 
A woman begs amongst the traffic in Jakarta 
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the late 1990s when the Asian financial crisis struck, little 
attention is drawn to the fact that, alongside a prosperous 
middle class, there are many millions of very poor people 
in Indonesia. 
According to a national survey by the Central Statistics 
Agency in September 2006, almost 40 million people 
were living below the poverty line and almost 100 million 
were on the verge of absolute poverty.iv 
Travelling along the highways of Jakarta, one is struck 
by the striking contrast between gleaming skyscrapers 
accommodating offices, hotels and restaurants and the 
hovels and kiosks, and the many people living and 
sleeping on the sidewalks. Everywhere, there are 
hawkers carrying their wares dangling from shoulder 
poles who throng the pavements. With traffic moving at 
snail's pace along the congested lanes for most of the 
day, there is plenty of time for street hawkers and 
newspaper boys to offer their wares to people sitting 
comfortably in air-conditioned cars. 
Adding to the chaos are numerous motorcyclists 
weaving their way through the traffic, producing fumes 
that make Jakarta one of the most polluted cities in Asia, 
if not in the world. 
WHO: Alarming rise in suicides 
According to press reports, many Indonesians are so 
despondent about their lives of hardship that they commit 
suicide. The Jakarta Postv reported that tens of suicides 
had been reported in the media in the previous months. A 
sociologist from the University of Indonesia, Imam B. 
Prasodjo, said. '[The] traditional support system is no 
longer effective or it even no longer exists in an urban 
society like Jakarta. It makes life become harder for the 
poor.' 
The World Health Organisation recently published 
very alarming figures about the number of suicides in 
Indonesia. A study conducted in October by Trisakti 
University in Jakarta revealed that an estimated 1,500 
people on average commit suicide every day. in 
Indonesia. Professor Ahmad Prayitno from the mental 
health department of the University said that the 
economic crisis 'is the main reason ... followed by those 
suffering from mental illnesses.' Another factor was the 
socio-economic gap between wealthy families and those 
living in need. 
The study came to the conclusion that no fewer that 
100,000 Jakartans committed suicide in 2006. It said that 
the figure may be even higher as some suicides were 
reported as accidents.Vi 
i The Jakarta Post, 15 September 2007. 
ii Op.cit 
iii The Straits Times, 9 October 2007 
iv The Jakarta Post, 30 July, 2007. 
v The Jakarta Post, 7 June 2007 
vi The Jakarta Post, 9 October 2007. 
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government has won plaudits for allegedly being the only 
debt-free government in the world, but the lack of projects 
to repair the woeful infrastructure is puzzling. Xanana's 
criticisms of the previous government are partly correct 
but his own government's record is no better. 
The most puzzling question concerns the country's oil 
and gas revenues. While other oil-producing countries are 
enjoying bumper years due to the high oil prices, it is not 
clear what is happening with the more than US$2 billion 
dollars held in a government trust fund in the US, and 
earning interest. Much of the money could surely be used 
for the benefit of the Timor-Leste population . 
A way out? 
In May 2005, during a period of relative calm, the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General delivered a 
speech in Dili to mark the end of the UN peace-keeping 
operation and stated that the international community 
now recognised Timor-Leste as a safe and peaceful 
country and that the time had now arrived for security to 
be left to the domestic police and military forces. 
However, a year later, an international force consisting 
mostly of Australian military and police had to step in 
again, following a decision of the UN Security Council. 
The reputation of Timor-Leste had become tarnished. 
While UN-bashing is easy, the reality of the Timar 
crisis is much more complex. The political and economic 
crisis is grave and needs to be addressed swiftly. The oil 
and gas revenues should be utilised for a variety of 
programmes, including repairing the dreadful state of the 
infrastructure. Making road-building a top priority, for 
example, would have the knock-on effect of reducing the 
level of unemployment. Unless and until the economy is 
properly handled, the population of Timor-Leste will 
continue to feel that their independence in 2002 has 
brought them nothing. 
Efforts to firid a compromise between the two political 
blocks should continue. A few days before the attack on 
Ramos-Horta, a meeting took place at his house when he, 
, Xanana, and a delegation of Fretilin stalwarts met to 
discuss the deadlock. Fretilin suggested that a general 
election should be held soon bearing in mind the 
unsatisfactory performance of the government but this 
was rejected by Xanana who insisted that his government 
would be able to solve all the problems. 
The recent crisis in Kenya provides an instructive 
comparison. In that country with both political forces being 
almost equal, mediation from the outside was needed in 
order to find a compromise. A similar solution is badly 
needed in Timor-Leste. Since Fretilin emerged as the 
strongest political force in the country with the most seats 
in parliament, it cannot be excluded from government. 
However, recent developments do not give grounds 
for optimism. Many basic problems remain. Economically, 
by contrast with most countries of South-East Asia, Timar~ 
Leste lacks an entrepreneurial class of street hawkers 
and shopkeepers. The lack of security casts doubt on the 
legitimacy of the government institutions. The culture of 
violence and impunity only makes things worse. Perhaps, 
the ending of the military rebellion, which now seems to 
be underway, can be the starting point for the building of 
a new Timor-Leste. 
35 
Continued from page 24 
killed and 250,000 people being forcibly displaced to 
West Timor are not good. Furthermore, the report is 
unlikely to contribute to sustainable friendship between 
the peoples of Indonesia and Timor-Leste given its 
apparent aim to bury the past, undermine the search for 
justice and sanction impunity. 
17. In the words of a member of an Indonesia-based 
NGO cited by the CoE: 'There are no problems at all 
between Indonesians and East Timorese, so a 
reconciliation between peoples of the two countries is not 
needed. The problem of human rights violations in East 
Timor does not lie in people-to-people relations, but lies 
instead with the TNI and its militias as the alleged 
perpetrators of the violence against the East Timorese'. 
18. The CAVR report already provides a detailed 
historical record of the human rights violations committed 
in Timor-Leste and the CAVR has undertaken important 
grassroots reconciliation initiatives. The cause of justice, 
truth, reconciliation and friendship would be better served 
by the wider dissemination of the CAVR report and 
Continued from page 33 
provided for the creation of these bodies, the Law on 
Aceh Governance was watered down when it was finally 
adopted. 
The demand for justice is strong 
Ill feelings towards Jakarta remain high in Aceh, as 
clearly expressed in the local elections. Many Acehnese 
still demand justice for many gross human rights 
violations: extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, 
torture, rape and other forms of violence. Responsibility 
for the creation of an ad hoc human rights court rests with 
national parliament but it is doubtful whether they have 
the courage to set it up. 
The third issue is the release of the· remaining political 
prisoners. The Indonesian government certainly made an 
important gesture by releasing the vast majority of the 
political prisoners after the MoU was signed. Quite a 
number of GAM prisoners had been found guilty of 
criminal actions, and in a display of political will the 
majority of the 2,000 prisoners were freed. At the last 
count seven political prisoners are still in custody, 
including three in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta (Tengku 
lsmuhadi , lrwan llyas and Ibrahim Hasan) and one in 
Sukamiskin Prison in Bandung (Dinan Sabardiman). 
While awaiting a decision to release the men, NGOs 
have demanded that they should serve the remainder of 
their sentences in Aceh, to be closer to their families. 
Serious incident kills five people 
On 1 March this year, a crowd of around one hundred 
people attacked and set fire to the KPA (the Aceh 
Transitional Commission) office, the office of former GAM 
rebels. Four people were burned to death inside while the 
fifth was thrown down a well. The attack occurred in the 
remote Atu Lintang area of Central Aceh. 
This is by far the most serious incident since the 
Helsinki peace agreement was signed in August 2005. 
Several militia groups are known to have' been active in 
the region and there is a history of conflicts between 
militia groups and pro-independence villagers. During an 
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implementation of its recommendations by both 
governments and the international community. This 
should start with the renewal by the UN of the Serious 
Crimes Process and the provision of sufficient resources 
to enable it to continue to investigate and try cases 
arising from the period 1975-1999.Vii 
i See Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth , International Center for 
Transitional Justice, January 2008, p. 24 and Annex for an analysis of 
witnesses and table of those who appeared before the CTF: 
http://www. ictj. org/images/contenU? 171772. pdf 
ii Available at http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/pdf3/N0542617.pdf. 
iii Statement of the Spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon, 26 July 2007, SG/SM/11101 
iv It has also been suggested that the ToR may violate the 
Constitutions of both countries. See Too Much Friendship, Too Little 
Truth , op. cit., note i. 
v Op. cit ., note. i. 
vii See 'Indonesian military must take responsibility for 1999 violence: 
witness, AFP, 26 Sept 2007 (concerning testimony of Fransisco de 
Carvalho Lopes); and 'CTF hears of offers of 'cash, weapons', Jakarta 
Post, 26 Sept 2007 (concerning testimony of Tomas A Goncalves). 
vii See CAVR recommendations 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 
earlier peace agreement in 2003, there was an incident in 
the same region when a member of the Joint Security 
Committee was beaten up. As a result, peace talks that 
were then in progress were abandoned. 
Nine NGOs in Aceh have called on the local 
administration to set up an independent team of inquiry 
into the incident and have suggested that the National 
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